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(2017) 
APPLICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION TO 
GUANTANAMO BAY 
GUANTANAMO AND THE CONFLICT OF LAWS:   
RASUL AND BEYOND 
KERMIT ROOSEVELT III† 
Of the legal issues raised by the Bush Administration’s conduct of 
the war on terror, the detention of alleged “enemy combatants” pre-
sents perhaps the starkest conflict between individual liberty and ex-
ecutive authority.  The Executive has claimed the power to designate 
individuals as enemy combatants and thereafter to hold them indefi-
nitely without judicial review or access to counsel.  A triad of cases de-
cided by the Supreme Court in its October 2003 Term put this claim 
to the test and generally rejected it.1 
Two cases dealt with Americans confined in the Navy brig in 
Charleston, South Carolina.  Yaser Hamdi, allegedly captured on the 
field of battle in Afghanistan, was held entitled as a matter of Fifth 
Amendment Due Process to “a meaningful opportunity to contest the 
factual basis for that detention before a neutral decisionmaker,” and 
to the assistance of counsel in that proceeding.2  The claims of Jose 
Padilla, arrested in Chicago and detained initially in New York before 
transport to the Charleston brig, received a slightly less welcoming re-
ception:  over the dissent of four Justices, the Court held that his ha-
beas petition was improperly filed in the Southern District of New 
York and ordered its dismissal.3  Padilla will, however, be able to take 
advantage of the same rights as Hamdi upon refiling in South Caro-
lina. 
No such confident prediction can be made with respect to the fur-
ther proceedings contemplated by the Court’s opinion in the third 
 
 † Assistant Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School.  I thank Gerald Neu-
man, Catherine Struve, and the participants at a Penn faculty workshop for helpful 
comments.  John Maselli provided able research assistance. 
1 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 
(2004); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 124 S. Ct. 2711 (2004). 
2 See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2635, 2652. 
3 See Padilla, 124 S. Ct. at 2727. 
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case, Rasul v. Bush.4  There, the Justices affirmed that citizens of 
friendly countries confined in the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay 
could challenge their detention by filing habeas petitions.5  Petition-
ers’ counsel urged the Court to resolve only this preliminary question, 
and the Court accepted the invitation.6  The result was a decision that 
rejected the Executive’s claim to complete freedom from judicial scru-
tiny but left unclear precisely what rights the petitioners have that 
might be vindicated by a habeas petition.7 
Rasul is thus a victory for the rule of law, but one whose magni-
tude has yet to be determined.  My aim in this Article is to offer some 
speculation about the question the Court left unanswered, and in par-
ticular to do so from the perspective of conflict of laws.  The Court has 
not always understood extraterritorial application of American law to 
present a conflicts issue, but I hope to show that taking this perspec-
tive will allow us a clearer understanding of that difficult question.  
Equally important, bringing conflicts theory to bear on extraterritori-
ality will reflect light back on the theory, offering some lessons that 
can be applied to conflicts more generally. 
Part I of the Article discusses the Rasul decision in detail, consid-
ering it in the context of both the other detention cases and the 
Court’s most recent decisions about the extraterritorial scope of 
American law.  It concludes that Rasul is most plausibly read to imply 
that the Constitution extends rights to the Guantanamo detainees.8  
Part II describes the reasons why this extension is surprising; it traces 
 
4 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004). 
5 See Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2698. 
6 See Brief for Petitioners at 20, Rasul (No. 03-334), available at 
http://www.abanet.org/publiced/preview/briefs/pdfs_03/334Pet.pdf (suggesting that 
the analysis of what due process rights petitioners may invoke “can wait for another 
day”); Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2699 (“What is presently at stake is only whether the federal 
courts have jurisdiction to determine the legality of the Executive’s potentially indefi-
nite detention of individuals who claim to be wholly innocent of wrongdoing.”). 
7 As I will argue later, the most sensible reading of Rasul would take it to imply 
that the Guantanamo detainees have some form of due process rights under the Fifth 
Amendment.  See infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.  The aim of this Article, 
however, is not to tease out implications from the Court’s opinion but rather to con-
sider the extraterritorial reach of the Constitution as a more general matter, and in 
particular as a problem in the conflict of laws. 
8 Surprisingly, the Executive still seems intent upon arguing that the detainees 
have no constitutional rights at all, asserting that “[a]s aliens detained by the military 
outside the sovereign territory of the United States and lacking a sufficient connection 
to the country, petitioners have no cognizable constitutional rights.”  See Neil A. Lewis, 
New Fight on Guantánamo Rights, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2004, at A18 (quoting the Execu-
tive’s district court filing in Rasul on remand). 
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the development of the Court’s extraterritoriality jurisprudence, from 
the early territorialist dogma to the more recent expansions.  Part III 
turns from doctrine to theory, exploring the various arguments for 
and against extraterritoriality immanent in the case law and urged by 
scholars.  It asserts that these theories have less resolving power than is 
commonly supposed; most, in fact, beg the question.  Part IV explicitly 
invokes the methodology of conflicts.  Though this methodology does 
not give a clear answer either, its application does frame the question 
in a more analytically tractable manner.  This Part also argues that the 
exercise of applying conflicts methodology sheds some light on con-
flicts itself; having reformed our approach to conflicts in response, we 
are left in a better position to tackle the question of the extraterrito-
rial scope of the Constitution.  Part V returns to the case of Guan-
tanamo, applying the methodology derived in the preceding part to 
the Due Process Clause. 
I.  EXECUTIVE DETENTION AND EXTRATERRITORIALITY  
IN OT 2003 
The Rasul petitioners are two Australians and twelve Kuwaitis cap-
tured in Afghanistan and Pakistan and subsequently transferred to 
Guantanamo Bay, where they were confined without charges or access 
to counsel.9  According to their petitions, all were engaged in inno-
cent conduct such as providing humanitarian aid, visiting relatives, or 
arranging marriage.10  They were arrested by various local authorities 
and turned over to U.S. forces, in some cases in exchange for boun-
ties.11  Through various next friends, they sought to invoke federal ju-
risdiction to review the legality of their confinement. 
The district court dismissed the petitions for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction, and the D.C. Circuit affirmed.12  Like the district court, 
the D.C. Circuit relied on Johnson v. Eisentrager,13 in which the Su-
preme Court rejected the habeas petitions of German nationals con-
 
9 Two British citizens, Shafiq Rasul and Asif Iqbal, were among the petitioners at 
the district court and court of appeals stages of the litigation but were released prior to 
the Supreme Court’s decision.  See Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2690 n.1.  Other Guantanamo 
detainees were initially arrested in other countries, including Bosnia, Zambia, and 
Gambia.  See David Rose, Guantánamo Bay on Trial, VANITY FAIR, Jan. 2004, at 88, 133 
(describing the nationalities and places of arrest of the Guantanamo detainees). 
10 See Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1136-37 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
11 See id. 
12 See Al Odah v. United States, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55 (D.D.C. 2002) (mem.), aff’d, 
321 F.3d 1134 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
13 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
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fined in the Landsberg prison in Germany following convictions by 
military tribunals in China.14  The D.C. Circuit read Eisentrager, as 
glossed by later Supreme Court decisions, to establish that the U.S. 
Constitution offered aliens abroad no protection against the U.S. gov-
ernment.15  If the Constitution gave such people no rights, the D.C. 
Circuit reasoned, “[w]e cannot see why, or how, the writ [of habeas 
corpus] may be made available.”16 
Given the initial premise that the Constitution is territorial in 
scope, at least as to aliens, the D.C. Circuit’s reasoning makes some 
sense.  To permit the filing of a habeas petition alleging violations of 
constitutional rights when the court has already determined that the 
petitioner has no constitutional rights that could be violated is a cha-
rade at best pointless, and more likely cruel.17  The most surprising 
feature of the Supreme Court’s decision in Rasul, then, may be that 
the Court found a way to reverse the D.C. Circuit without contesting 
the territorialist premise.18  Understanding how the Court managed to 
do so requires a bit of a detour into pre- and post-Eisentrager habeas 
jurisprudence, as well as a more thorough discussion of Eisentrager it-
self. 
 
14 Id. at 790-91. 
15 See Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1141 (discussing Eisentrager, United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990), and Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001)). 
16 Id. 
17 The reasoning makes only some sense, though, because such petitioners might 
still be able to identify rights under “the laws or treaties of the United States,” the 
other elements of the habeas trinity.  See 28 U.S.C. 2241(a), (c)(3) (2004) (authorizing 
district courts to hear habeas petitions by those allegedly “in custody in violation of the 
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States”).  To deal with that possibility, the 
D.C. Circuit invoked an alternate formulation of the Eisentrager holding, that the peti-
tioners lacked “the privilege of litigation” in U.S. courts.  See Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1144 
(quoting Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 777-78).  On this point, however, it seems quite likely 
that the dispositive factor in Eisentrager was the petitioners’ status as nonresident enemy 
aliens.  See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 776 (“[T]he nonresident enemy alien, especially one 
who has remained in the service of the enemy, does not have even [a] qualified access 
to our courts . . . .”).  The Rasul petitioners are nonresident alien friends.  See Al-Odah, 
321 F.3d at 1139-40.  Such people certainly can litigate in U.S. courts, and it is hard to 
see why the mere fact of military custody (which the D.C. Circuit found dispositive) 
should deprive them of that privilege.  See Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2699 (“The fact that peti-
tioners in these cases are being held in military custody is immaterial to the question of 
the District Court’s jurisdiction over their nonhabeas statutory claims.”).  As my con-
cern here is the extraterritorial application of the Constitution, I will not address this 
issue further. 
18 As I will explain later, I believe the reversal cannot be read as carrying anything 
less than a strong hint that the petitioners do possess substantive constitutional rights.  
See infra notes 51-56 and accompanying text. 
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A.  Eisentrager, Ahrens, and Braden 
Eisentrager, the Rasul majority observed, was decided under the re-
gime of Ahrens v. Clarke.19  The habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, then 
(as now) authorized federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus 
“within their respective jurisdictions.”20  Ahrens interpreted this lan-
guage to require, as a jurisdictional matter, that a habeas petitioner 
applying to a district court be confined within that district.21  Thus, 
district courts under the Ahrens regime had the power to issue writs of 
habeas corpus at the application only of petitioners confined within 
their district.  Correlatively, prisoners could file petitions only with the 
district court within whose district they were confined.  What this 
meant for prisoners confined outside the borders of any federal judi-
cial district, the Ahrens Court declined to decide,22 though (as the dis-
sent pointed out) if the limitation were truly jurisdictional, no special 
circumstances could remedy the absence of judicial power.23  Such 
people would have no means of seeking habeas relief, regardless of 
the legality of their confinement. 
This categorical restriction on the availability of habeas relief 
would seem to raise serious questions under the Suspension Clause,24 
and it was that constitutional doubt that drove the D.C. Circuit’s 
analysis in Eisentrager.  The D.C. Circuit (in an interesting counter-
point to its approach in Al Odah) started with the premise that “consti-
tutional prohibitions apply directly to acts of Government, or Gov-
ernment officials, and are not conditioned upon persons or 
territory.”25  In consequence, “any person who is deprived of his liberty 
by officials of the United States, acting under purported authority of 
 
19 335 U.S. 188 (1948). 
20 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (2004). 
21 See Ahrens, 335 U.S. at 190 (“It is not sufficient in our view that the jailer or cus-
todian alone be found in the jurisdiction.”). 
22 See id. at 192 n.4. 
23 See id. at 209 (Rutledge, J., dissenting) (“[I]f absence of the body detained from 
the territorial jurisdiction of the court having jurisdiction of the jailer creates a total 
and irremediable void in the court’s capacity to act . . . then it is hard to see how that 
gap can be filled . . . .”); Charles Fairman, Some New Problems of the Constitution Following 
the Flag, 1 STAN. L. REV. 587, 632 (1949) (“But if the statute makes the presence of the 
petitioner a requisite to jurisdiction, how can it make any difference whether the deten-
tion is in no district rather than in a different district?”). 
24 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall 
not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may 
require it.”). 
25 Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961, 965 (D.C. Cir. 1949), rev’d, 339 U.S. 763 
(1950). 
  
2022 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 153: 2017 
that Government,”26 could invoke due process rights under the Fifth 
Amendment, and the right to habeas corpus as a means of vindicating 
those rights could not be defeated “by an omission in a federal juris-
dictional statute.”27 
While apparently conceding that the habeas statute, as interpreted 
in Ahrens, contained just such an omission, the D.C. Circuit also stated 
that the statute must be construed to make habeas jurisdiction “coex-
tensive with executive power, at least in so far as prisoners in jail are 
concerned.”28  Finding statutory jurisdiction present “by compulsion 
of the Constitution itself,” the D.C. Circuit directed the district court 
to resolve the merits of the petitions.29 
The Supreme Court reversed, in an opinion striking for its lack of 
clarity.  The Court noted what it took to be the salient facts about Eis-
entrager’s status: 
[Eisentrager] (a) is an enemy alien; (b) has never been or resided in the 
United States; (c) was captured outside of our territory and there held in 
military custody as a prisoner of war; (d) was tried and convicted by a 
Military Commission sitting outside the United States; (e) for offenses 
against laws of war committed outside the United States; (f) and is at all 
times imprisoned outside the United States.
30
 
Without explaining the precise significance of these factors to its 
various lines of reasoning, the Court then went on to suggest that the 
petitioners (a) simply lacked standing to litigate in U.S. courts, regard-
less of what substantive rights they might have;31 (b) possessed no Fifth 
Amendment rights;32 and (c) had failed to state a claim on the mer-
its.33  With respect to the question of the scope of the habeas statute, 
the Court made only a few dismissive remarks.  It noted that nothing 
“in our statutes” conferred upon petitioners a right to the habeas writ, 
and it observed that as the petitioners had failed to present a “basis for 
invoking federal judicial power in any district,” there was no need to 
decide where, if anywhere, they might have filed had they been able to 
demonstrate such a basis.34 
 
26 Id. at 963. 
27 Id. at 965. 
28 Id. at 967. 
29 Id. at 966, 968. 
30 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 777 (1950). 
31 See id. at 776-77. 
32 See id. at 782-85. 
33 See id. at 785-90. 
34 See id. at 768, 790-91. 
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The cursory treatment is understandable, given the multitude of 
different justifications for the Court’s decision.  If the petitioners 
lacked Fifth Amendment rights, application of the rule of Ahrens 
would pose no constitutional problems; if they lacked standing, the 
rule would not even need to be applied. 
The Eisentrager Court did not need to confront the possible anom-
aly created by Ahrens:  the case of a habeas petitioner unlawfully con-
fined beyond the bounds of any federal district.  Subsequent cases, 
dealing with Americans confined abroad, did, and found habeas ju-
risdiction without discussion, in apparent derogation of Ahrens’s juris-
dictional rule.35  The practical erosion of Ahrens was recognized in 
Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court,36 which explicitly rejected Ahrens 
and converted what had been an “inflexible jurisdictional rule” into 
an endorsement of “traditional principles of venue.”37 
B.  Rasul Revisited 
With the Ahrens rule out of the way, it became possible to argue 
that the habeas statute, by its plain text, allowed the Rasul petitioners 
to seek habeas relief.  And that argument is the one the Court ac-
cepted.  Petitioners alleged confinement was “in violation of the 
[Constitution and] laws of the United States,” and the statute “re-
quires nothing more.”38 
Finding habeas jurisdiction under the statute was undoubtedly an 
appealing resolution for the Justices in the majority.  It allowed the 
Court to reject the Executive’s claim of unreviewable authority with-
out taking any more dramatic steps, such as explicitly reversing Eisen-
trager or announcing that the Guantanamo detainees possessed consti-
tutional rights.39  Moreover, the petitioners, exercising good strategic 
 
35 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955) (reaching mer-
its of habeas petition filed by prisoner in Korea); Burns v. Wilson, 346 U.S. 137 (1953) 
(same for prisoners in Guam). 
36 410 U.S. 484 (1973). 
37 Id. at 500; see also Moore v. Olsen, 368 F.3d 757, 758 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[A]fter 
Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, which overruled Ahrens, the location of a collateral 
attack is best understood as a matter of venue . . . .” (citation omitted)), cert. denied, 125 
S Ct. 362 (2004). 
38 Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2698. 
39 Justice Scalia, in dissent, argued with customary verve that the majority was hid-
ing its “irresponsible overturning of settled law” behind Braden, which could not be 
read to undercut Eisentrager’s statutory analysis because it “did not so much as men-
tion Eisentrager.”  Id. at 2701 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  But it is not at all surprising that a 
decision rejecting by name the leading case for a particular reading of the habeas stat-
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judgment, had sought no more.  All the same, it makes the opinion 
somewhat less than fully satisfying.40 
What the Court did, essentially, was to decide that the petitioners 
fell within the scope of the habeas statute:  they were among the peo-
ple entitled to invoke it.  It is at this point that conflicts rears its ugly 
head, for the question of who among the marginal cases may claim 
the benefit of a particular law is one of the two quintessential conflicts 
questions.41  An answer based purely on the text of a statute is unlikely 
to be compelling, and may not even be sensible, for it is one of the 
constant refrains of conflicts scholars that legislatures typically do not 
specify either the scope of their statutes or the class of persons who 
may invoke them.42  Indeed, failure to do so is precisely what necessi-
tates conflicts analysis. 
The Court did not perform anything resembling that analysis.43  
Apart from the text of the statute, it invoked the presumption against 
extraterritoriality—a guide to statutory construction that itself ignores 
modern conflicts learning44—and then only to dismiss it.  The pre-
 
ute would not mention subsequent cases relying upon the rejected decision.  Eisen-
trager, of course, does mention Ahrens, see 339 U.S. at 767, 778, 790; and a rejection of 
Ahrens (something implicitly achieved by 1955, see cases cited supra note 35) therefore 
casts doubt on Eisentrager’s statutory interpretation. 
40 By this I mean no criticism of the majority; opinion writers have other things on 
their minds than pleasing the academic palate.  Indeed, as I will suggest, I believe the 
opinion should be understood to go a bit farther than it explicitly states. 
41 At least according to what I and others have urged is the most useful under-
standing of conflicts analysis.  See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 277, 291 (1990) [hereinafter Kramer, Rethinking] (“In [conflicts] cases, 
the court’s task is to interpret the laws to determine whether either confers a right to 
recover on the facts alleged in the particular case.”); Kermit Roosevelt III, The Myth of 
Choice of Law:  Rethinking Conflicts, 97 MICH. L. REV. 2448, 2467 (1999) [hereinafter 
Roosevelt, Myth] (“[W]hether the plaintiff has a right at all . . . . is a question of the 
scope of the right the plaintiff invokes—whether the law he appeals to grants rights to 
people in his situation.”).  The other question is how to handle conflicts between 
rights. 
42 See, e.g., Kramer, Rethinking, supra note 41, at 293 (“[T]he great majority of laws 
are silent with respect to extraterritorial reach . . . .”).  Thus, the Court’s assertion that 
the lack of a textual “distinction between Americans and aliens held in federal cus-
tody” means that “there is little reason to think that Congress intended the geographi-
cal coverage of the statute to vary depending on the detainee’s citizenship,”  Rasul, 124 
S. Ct. at 2696, is less than fully convincing. 
43 Although I do believe that the scope of the habeas statute, like the scope of the 
Constitution, presents a conflicts question, I will also argue that many approaches to 
conflicts are unhelpful in resolving the question.  See infra Parts IV.A-B.  I will argue 
further that their lack of utility suggests something about what conflicts analysis should 
look like.  See infra Part IV.C. 
44 See Larry Kramer, Vestiges of Beale:  Extraterritorial Application of American Law, 
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sumption against extraterritoriality, the Court stated, “certainly has no 
application to . . . persons detained within ‘the territorial jurisdiction’ 
of the United States.”45 
How, then, can the scope of the right to habeas be sensibly de-
termined?  Modern conflicts theory, at least that part which follows 
Brainerd Currie, would suggest that questions of extraterritorial ap-
plication should be resolved by considering the purpose of the stat-
ute.46  A not-implausible characterization of the purpose of habeas 
would be to allow petitioners to vindicate federal, notably constitu-
tional, rights.47  That purpose will, potentially, be implicated whenever 
a petition is filed by a federal rights-holder.  Thus, a plausible method 
of deciding whether a particular person should be entitled to file a 
 
1991 SUP. CT. REV. 179, 184 (1992) [hereinafter Kramer, Vestiges] (faulting the Court 
for “thoughtlessly attempt[ing] to revive the original principle” of territoriality rather 
than “learning from the diversity of views that [have] emerged”). 
45 Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2696 (quoting Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285 
(1949)). 
46 See, e.g., BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 367 
(1963) (suggesting that a court should “ascertain” the government policy “as it has 
been expressed in statutes and judicial decisions”); Kramer, Vestiges, supra note 44, at 
213 (“The basic premise . . . is that the court should determine what policy a law was 
enacted to achieve . . . .”). 
47 The Rasul petitioners asserted rights not only under the Constitution, but under 
the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706 (2000), international 
law, and the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).  See Al Odah, 321 F.3d at 1137 
(detailing claims).  The meat of the complaints, however, seems constitutional.  The 
Alien Tort Statute does not create any substantive rights but merely grants federal 
courts jurisdiction to hear certain claims under international law.  See Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2755 (2004).  The Administrative Procedure Act claims re-
lied at least in part on alleged constitutional violations.  See Rasul, 215 F. Supp. 2d at 58 
(“Plaintiffs allege that Defendants’ conduct constitutes arbitrary, unlawful, and uncon-
stitutional behavior in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.”).  Customary 
international law is considered by many scholars to have the status of federal common 
law.  See, e.g., Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority, and the Preemptive Power of Interna-
tional Law, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 295, 301-02 (1995) (citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sab-
batino, 376 U.S. 398 (1963), for the proposition that customary international law must 
be part of federal law); Harold Hongju Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 
HARV. L. REV. 1824, 1835 (1998) (“[E]ven after Erie and Sabbatino, federal courts retain 
legitimate authority to incorporate bona fide rules of customary international law into 
federal common law.”).  But the issue is controversial within the academy, compare Cur-
tis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customary International Law as Federal Common Law:  
A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 HARV. L. REV. 815, 870 (1997) (arguing that cus-
tomary international law is not a part of federal law in the absence of “political branch 
authorization”), with Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary Interna-
tional Law:  A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 FORDHAM L. REV. 371, 376 
(1997) (“[S]uch rules [of customary international law] are presumptively incorporated 
into the U.S. domestic legal system and given effect as rules of federal law.”), and un-
settled in the courts.  Consequently, I will focus on the constitutional rights at stake. 
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habeas petition would be to ask whether that person alleges facts sug-
gesting the possession of relevant federal rights.  Extending the right 
to seek habeas to people who have no rights to vindicate is, as the D.C. 
Circuit observed in Al Odah, senseless;48 it is hard to imagine that the 
drafters of the habeas statute would have approved such a result had 
they considered it. 
The scope of habeas jurisdiction, then, may plausibly be deemed 
coextensive with the scope of substantive federal rights—in this case, 
constitutional rights.49  That conclusion—embraced, in different ways, 
by the D.C. Circuit opinions in Eisentrager and Al Odah, and implicitly 
endorsed by the Supreme Court decisions reaching the merits of ha-
beas petitions filed by Americans confined abroad—entangles the 
question of statutory jurisdiction with at least the preliminary merits of 
the constitutional claims.  The prospect must have held little appeal 
for the cautious Rasul majority, but it is, I think, what understanding 
Rasul as a conflicts problem should suggest. 
And that is one point that the conflicts perspective allows us to 
make:  the scope of habeas jurisdiction may be hard to sever from the 
scope of the underlying substantive rights that habeas is meant to pro-
tect.  It is a point of which the Rasul Court seemed to be aware, for, 
despite its claim to be deciding only the statutory issue, the Rasul ma-
jority’s opinion casts long shadows over the merits.  Its dismissal of the 
presumption against extraterritorial scope of statutory law in the con-
text of Guantanamo suggests that a territorialist argument for restrict-
 
48 Al Odah v. United States, 321 F.3d 1134, 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2003). 
49 Indeed, the text of the statute (granting courts authority to issue the writ to 
prisoners “in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United 
States,” 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2000)) would seem to place the violation on a par with 
the custody.  The Supreme Court has consistently treated the custody as a jurisdic-
tional requirement, i.e., a limitation on the set of persons entitled to seek the writ.  See, 
e.g., Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 494 (1989).  Whether it makes sense to treat cus-
tody as a prerequisite to subject matter jurisdiction, rather than a merits issue, is an-
other question.  Confusion of subject matter jurisdiction with merits is pervasive in the 
extraterritoriality case law; when the Court finds a plaintiff not within the set of people 
protected by a law by reason of geographical scope, it dismisses for lack of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction when the more conventional resolution would be dismissal for failure 
to state a claim.  See, e.g., EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991).  But see 
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946) (“[I]t is well settled that the failure to state a 
proper cause of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for 
want of jurisdiction.”).  The problem here appears to be the belief that the fact that a 
law “does not apply” means something other than that it grants the plaintiff no rights.  
See Larry Kramer, Interest Analysis and the Presumption of Forum Law, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1301, 1309 (1989) (“‘[C]hoosing’ [a law] is not a step that must be completed before 
the court can reach the merits, and there is no reason to insist that the court ‘apply’ 
some jurisdiction’s law.”). 
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ing constitutional rights may likewise be deemed inapplicable.50  More 
suggestive still is Justice Kennedy’s observation in concurrence that 
“[f]rom a practical perspective, the indefinite lease of Guantanamo 
Bay has produced a place that belongs to the United States, extending 
the ‘implied protection’ of the United States to it.”51  Last, the Court 
drops a footnote that all-but-explicitly decides the issue:  “Petitioners’ 
allegations . . . unquestionably describe ‘custody in violation of the 
Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.’”52 
These hints suggest that the future holds a relatively simple an-
swer to the constitutional question the Rasul Court purported to leave 
undecided.  Ultimately, it seems likely that the Court will make clear 
that the petitioners enjoy constitutional due process protections 
akin—if not identical—to those accorded Hamdi.53  Eisentrager will 
have to be confronted at some point, but the Court’s verbatim recital 
 
50 124 S. Ct. at 2696. 
51 Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2700 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Johnson v. Eisen-
trager, 339 U.S. 763, 777-78 (1950)). 
52 Id. at 2698 n.15 (majority opinion).  In light of these strong hints, it is disap-
pointing, though perhaps not surprising, that the Executive has continued to assert on 
remand that petitioners possess no constitutional rights at all.  See In re Guantanamo 
Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 454 (D.D.C. 2005). 
53 In Hamdi’s case, the plurality settled on the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test, 
which weighs the private interest at stake against the governmental interest, consider-
ing the “risk of an erroneous deprivation” and the “probable value, if any, of additional 
or substitute safeguards.”  See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).  That is, 
Hamdi directs courts reviewing the claims of detained U.S. citizens to adjust the process 
provided so as to minimize the aggregate costs of erroneous deprivations (weighted 
according to the private interest at stake) and burdens on the government (weighted 
according to the significance of the governmental interest or function).  Hamdi, 124 S. 
Ct. at 2646.  The interests at stake, one would think, are the individual’s interest in lib-
erty and the government’s interest in efficacious prosecution of the war on terror.  
Oddly, the Court asserted instead that “[o]n the other side of the scale are the weighty 
and sensitive governmental interests in ensuring that those who have in fact fought 
with the enemy during a war do not return to battle against the United States.”  Id. at 
2647.  But that is an interest that comes into play only if the goal is reducing the num-
ber of mistakes in the individual’s favor.  Providing more process—as distinguished 
from, for instance, imposing a higher burden of proof—should actually increase the 
accuracy of the factfinding process rather than simply altering the distribution of er-
rors.  Thus, more process, while it will undoubtedly impose greater burdens on the 
government, should not increase the number of enemy combatants erroneously re-
leased to rejoin the foe.  Cf. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 283 
(1990) (noting the connection between burden of proof and error distribution).  Not, 
that is, unless it is being compared to a system under which the Executive simply de-
tains people at its pleasure, a system under which the risk of erroneous release would 
indeed seem slight.  Mathews does not, however, seem to start from a baseline of abso-
lute Executive power. 
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of Eisentrager’s “six critical facts”54 suggests a willingness to distinguish 
it, most likely on the grounds suggested by Justice Kennedy:  that for-
mal sovereignty is not the touchstone for the “implied protection” of 
the U.S. Constitution.55  Even if it is not considered the precise equiva-
lent of U.S. sovereign territory, Guantanamo may be treated like the 
Canal Zone in Panama or the trust territory of the Pacific Islands, 
places under U.S. jurisdiction and control whose occupants have con-
sistently been held to enjoy at least “fundamental” constitutional 
rights.56 
If the Court takes this route, which strikes me as the most likely 
sequel, the result will be significant in terms of allocating jurisdiction 
between the military and civilian courts.57  It will be less relevant for 
 
54 Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2693. 
55 Id. at 2700 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
56 The distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental rights comes from 
the Insular Cases, in particular Justice White’s analysis of the rights of persons in “unin-
corporated” territories (those not destined for statehood).  See, e.g., Downes v. Bidwell, 
182 U.S. 244, 288-94 (1901) (White, J., concurring).  See generally United States v. Ver-
dugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 268 (1990) (discussing Insular Cases); GERALD L. NEU-
MAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION:  IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL 
LAW 85-89 (1996) (same).  The analogy to the Canal Zone and trust territory was 
urged upon the Second Circuit in the litigation over the rights of Haitian refugees de-
tained in Guantanamo.  See Brief of Amicus Curiae International Human Rights Law 
Group at 17-21, Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1992) 
(No. 92-6090), available at 1992 WL 12024989.  The court expressed some sympathy 
but did not resolve the issue, and its decision was ultimately vacated on mootness 
grounds.  See Haitian Ctrs. Council, 969 F.2d at 1342-44, vacated sub nom. Sale v. Haitian 
Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 918, 918 (1993).  The Rasul petitioners, presenting only a 
statutory claim, did not make this argument but are certain to do so on remand.  See 
generally Gerald L. Neuman, Closing the Guantanamo Loophole, 50 LOY. L. REV. 1, 15-32 
(2004) (presenting a modified version of this argument). 
57 Eisentrager, interestingly, characterized the question before the Court as ulti-
mately “one of jurisdiction of civil courts of the United States vis-à-vis military authori-
ties”—a separation of powers, or, we might say, an interbranch conflicts case, rather 
than an international one.  See 339 U.S. at 765; see also Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2700 (Ken-
nedy, J., concurring) (“The decision in Eisentrager indicates that there is a realm of po-
litical authority over military affairs where the judicial power may not enter.”).  Before 
the district court in Rasul, the Executive tried a somewhat more subtle tack, asserting 
that while the petitioners might have some rights, they were for the Executive to de-
termine.  See Rasul v. Bush, 215 F. Supp. 2d 55, 56 (D.D.C. 2002), rev’d, 124 S. Ct. 2686 
(2004).  See also Fairman, supra note 23, at 619-20 (noting the possibility that a matter 
may be governed “by law of the United States as found by the executive branch of the 
Government”).  But this Court has been emphatic about its exclusive role as constitu-
tional interpreter; for better or for worse, litigants nowadays are entitled to the Court’s 
Constitution and no other.  See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES 7-
8 (2004) (questioning the modern Supreme Court’s rejection of popular constitution-
alism and arguing for greater deference to the constitutional interpretations of the 
executive and legislative branches).  Hamdi confronts this issue and gives a clear an-
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conflicts more generally—less relevant, certainly, than if the Court 
were to hold that aliens abroad enjoy Due Process rights.  There is, I 
think, almost no chance that the Court will take this latter course.  To 
a naïve reader of the Rasul opinion, however, it might seem an equally 
plausible outcome.  The Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, like 
the habeas statute, makes no mention of citizenship or geography.58  
The straightforward textualist methodology the Court employed with 
the statute would suggest a similar conclusion:  the protections of the 
Due Process Clause extend to any person alleging that the U.S. gov-
ernment has deprived him of liberty without due process of law.  The 
words of the Constitution require nothing more.59  And so, as Justice 
Ginsburg put it recently, “[o]ne might assume, therefore, that [the 
Bill of Rights] guides and controls U.S. officialdom wherever in the 
world they carry our flag or their credentials.”60 
This argument can claim not only an affinity with the Rasul 
Court’s methodology but also some intuitive appeal.  If we do cherish 
constitutional freedoms, if we do think that constitutional rights are, 
 
swer:  if constitutional rights are at stake, the judicial power will not be turned aside.  
See Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2650 (“Whatever power the United States Constitution envi-
sions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy organizations 
in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when indi-
vidual liberties are at stake.”). 
58 Louis Henkin (though certainly not a naïve reader) made this point twenty 
years ago:  “The choice in the Bill of Rights of the word ‘person’ rather than ‘citizen’ 
was not fortuitous; nor was the absence of a geographical limitation.  Both reflect a 
commitment to respect the individual rights of all human beings.”  Louis Henkin, The 
Constitution as Compact and as Conscience:  Individual Rights Abroad and at Our Gates, 27 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 11, 32 (1985). 
59 This analysis, of course, ignores the Rasul Court’s reference to the presumption 
against extraterritoriality.  124 S. Ct. at 2696.  The textualist still has resources, how-
ever.  It is now well settled that American citizens abroad can invoke the Constitution 
against the U.S. government.  See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 33 (1957).  Given that de-
gree of extraterritorial scope, the lack of any textual distinction between citizens and 
noncitizens (and the equally settled proposition that aliens within the United States 
can invoke Due Process rights, see, e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 102-
03 (1976)), would suggest that the Constitution must afford rights to aliens outside the 
U.S. as well.  My point here is not to endorse this argument, which, as the text notes, 
tilts rather strongly against our current jurisprudence.  It is rather to suggest that a 
more sophisticated methodology is desirable. 
60 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Looking Beyond Our Borders:  The Value of a Comparative Per-
spective in Constitutional Adjudication, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 329, 334 (2004).  The 
Third Restatement of Foreign Relations Law tentatively endorses the same position, though 
in this regard it is less a restatement than a prognostication.  See RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 721 cmt. b (1987) 
(“Although the matter has not been definitely adjudicated, the Constitution probably 
governs also at least some exercises of authority by the United States in respect of some 
aliens abroad.”). 
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in some normative sense, right, it is surprising that the accident of ge-
ography should control the ability to invoke them.61  Why should a 
governmental action repugnant to our deepest values become ano-
dyne merely because it occurs outside our borders? 
It might come as a surprise to the naïve reader, then (though un-
doubtedly not to any of this symposium’s participants), to learn that, 
as Justice Ginsburg went on to observe, “that is not our current juris-
prudence.”62  Why it is not—and whether it should be, or more par-
ticularly what form the analysis of that question should take—is the 
subject of this Article.  The next Part takes a fairly brief trip through 
the case law, offering an historical perspective on the evolution of our 
jurisprudence with respect to the extraterritorial scope of federal law 
and the Constitution.  Because it provides an illuminating sidelight 
here as elsewhere, I also discuss the contemporaneous development of 
conflicts jurisprudence. 
II.  DOCTRINE:  A HISTORY OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY  
FROM THE CONFLICTS PERSPECTIVE 
Early cases took a strong and unequivocal position on the scope of 
both the Constitution and federal law more generally.  In 1891, the 
Court stated flatly that “[t]he constitution can have no operation in 
another country.”63  With respect to federal law, the proclamations 
were equally forceful; in 1883 the Court announced the proposition 
“[t]hat the laws of a country have no extra-territorial force” as “an ax-
iom of international jurisprudence.”64 
 
61 “Accident” is of course a loaded word, an avatar of the “mere fortuity” invoked 
by courts in domestic conflicts cases to diminish the importance of a geographical 
connecting factor.  See, e.g., Simon v. United States, 341 F.3d 193, 202 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(noting the plaintiff’s argument that it was a “mere fortuity” that the air traffic control 
center directing their plane was located in Indiana).  Sometimes geography is indeed 
relevant, not in the crude territorialist sense, but because it relates to the purpose of a 
law (speed limits being the standard example).  And to call the location of the Guan-
tanamo prison camp accidental is to indulge a naivete beyond that of even the most 
committed textualist.  See Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2710-11 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The 
Commander in Chief and his subordinates had every reason to expect that the in-
ternment of combatants at Guantanamo Bay would not have the consequence of bring-
ing the cumbersome machinery of our domestic courts into military affairs.”). 
62 Ginsburg, supra note 60, at 334. 
63 In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891).  The petitioner in Ross had been convicted 
by a consular court in Japan of a murder committed aboard an American ship in a 
Japanese harbor, and he protested that this process deprived him of the rights to a 
grand jury indictment and a jury trial.  Id. at 454-58. 
64 Can. S. Ry. Co. v. Gebhard, 109 U.S. 527, 536 (1883). 
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Territoriality likewise held sway in domestic conflicts, where it was 
frequently considered to have the status of a constitutional rule, if not 
a law of nature.  Declaring a contract executed in New York valid un-
der New York law, the Court went on to observe that “this validity was 
not and could not be affected by the laws of the State of Texas, as in 
the nature of things such laws could have no extraterritorial opera-
tion.”65  In very few cases was the territorialist thesis supported by any 
reasoning.  The Court’s characterization of territoriality as an “axiom” 
neatly captures the extent to which it worked as the starting point, 
rather than the conclusion, of judicial analysis.  Some explanation can 
be given, however:  territoriality was a device for allocating authority 
among coequal sovereigns, be they states of the Union or nation-
states.66  Chief Justice Marshall traced the reasoning in The Antelope:  
“No principle of general law is more universally acknowledged, than 
the perfect equality of nations. . . . It results from this equality, that no 
one can rightfully impose a rule on another.  Each legislates for itself, 
but its legislation can operate on itself alone.”67 
The rigidity of the territorialist rule should not be overstated; ex-
ceptions existed for lands subject to no sovereign and even for appli-
cation of a state’s law to its own citizens.68  By 1909, Justice Holmes was 
 
65 Bond v. Hume, 243 U.S. 15, 20-21 (1917); see also, e.g., New York Life Ins. Co. v. 
Head, 234 U.S. 149, 161 (1914) (“[I]t would be impossible to permit the statutes of 
Missouri to operate beyond the jurisdiction of that State . . . without throwing down 
the constitutional barriers by which all the States are restricted within the orbits of 
their lawful authority and upon the preservation of which the Government under the 
Constitution depends.”).  Other famous products of the territorialist era include the 
civil procedure chestnut Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
66 See generally Kramer, Vestiges, supra note 44, at 188 (explaining territoriality in 
“public international law, adjudicatory jurisdiction, and conflict of laws” as “variations 
on a single theme—that of accommodating conflicting policies of independent sover-
eigns”). 
67 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 122 (1825).  Territoriality is, of course, not the only 
means of implementing an equality norm.  Modern conflicts theory has largely re-
jected territoriality, but I have suggested that it need not discard equality, and that in 
fact the Constitution provides courts with antidiscrimination norms that could be used 
to police state choice-of-law rules.  See Roosevelt, Myth, supra note 41, at 2518-33 (“In 
particular, Full Faith and Credit prevents consideration of the fact that a particular 
right is a local one, and Privileges and Immunities similarly prevents the fact that a 
party is (or is not) a forum domiciliary from having weight.”). 
68 See Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355-56 (1909) (noting the 
exceptions); Kramer, Vestiges, supra note 44, at 189-90 (same).  With respect to consti-
tutional law, one might expect even a looser approach.  As Catherine Struve observed 
to me in conversation, extraterritorial application of a rule—such as a constitutional 
prohibition—restricting the power of state authorities is not easily seen as an infringe-
ment on the sovereignty of another state.  The fact that territorialism does not make 
any such practical assessment of state interests is precisely the modern criticism. 
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characterizing it as a presumption to be applied “in case of doubt,” 
though also “the general and almost universal rule.”69  Even as a pre-
sumption, however, and even as it grew progressively riddled with ex-
ceptions and escape devices, territoriality proved a poor fit in an in-
creasingly interconnected world.  Gradually it gave ground as the 
twentieth century moved on.70  In personal jurisdiction, Pennoyer 
yielded to International Shoe;71 in domestic conflicts, the “choice of law 
revolution” swept from the law reviews into the state courts, though 
not entirely and not without resistance.72 
For a time, the jurisprudence with respect to federal law seemed 
to be keeping pace.  Justice Holmes’s analysis of the scope of federal 
law in American Banana was, in the words of Larry Kramer, “pure con-
flict of laws,” citing familiar conflicts cases and even Dicey’s treatise.73  
And when Learned Hand took the fateful step, in Alcoa Steamship, of 
extending the Sherman Act’s prohibitions to conduct abroad affecting 
commerce within the United States, he commented that limitations 
on the extraterritorial scope of federal statutes “generally correspond 
to those fixed by the ‘Conflict of Laws.’”74 
 
69 American Banana, 213 U.S. at 357, 356. 
70 See Kramer, Vestiges, supra note 44, at 192-93 (discussing the roughly contempo-
raneous erosion of territoriality in international law, personal jurisdiction, and conflict 
of laws). 
71 Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317-19 (1945). 
72 For an exhaustive description and assessment of the “revolution,” see Harold L. 
Korn, The Choice-of-Law Revolution:  A Critique, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 772 (1983). 
73 See Kramer, Vestiges, supra note 44, at 186-87 (observing that Holmes supported 
the opinion by citing such cases as Slater v. Mexican National Railroad and Milliken v. 
Pratt). 
74 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1945).  See 
also Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 613-15 (9th Cir. 1976) 
(“[T]o determine whether American authority should be asserted in a given case as a 
matter of international comity and fairness . . . [w]e believe that the field of conflict of 
laws presents the proper approach . . . .”).  With its invocation of international comity 
and fairness, Timberlane displays a theoretical sophistication beyond that of Alcoa.  Alcoa 
treated the extraterritorial scope of the Sherman Act as a single question:  either U.S. 
law applies or it does not.  148 F.2d at 443-44.  Timberlane recognized the possibility 
that while an act might fall within the scope of the Sherman Act, the defendant might 
nonetheless escape liability out of deference to the authority of a foreign state.  549 
F.2d at 613-15.  In conflicts terminology, it allowed for the possibility that U.S. law 
might not always prevail in a conflict with foreign law.  See Kramer, Vestiges, supra note 
44, at 193-94 (discussing Alcoa, Timberlane, and other conflicts-infused extraterritoriality 
cases).  Timberlane’s analysis thus contained two steps, rather than one.  See 549 F.2d at 
613 (“[T]here is the additional question which is unique to the international setting of 
whether the interests of, and links to, the United States—including the magnitude of 
the effect on American foreign commerce—are sufficiently strong, vis-à-vis those of 
other nations, to justify an assertion of extraterritorial authority.”).  See generally 
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With respect to the Constitution, the Insular Cases, decided be-
tween 1901 and 1922, seem perhaps even slightly ahead of their time.  
They did not explicitly invoke the field of domestic conflicts (though 
references to doctrines of international law were of course frequent); 
but the various Justices seeking to ascertain the Constitution’s scope 
deployed an array of interpretive methodologies impressive in their 
breadth and largely sensible in their substance.  Indeed, the ap-
proaches are both more appealing to the modern eye than the fine 
reticulations of Joseph Beale’s metaphysics and more sophisticated 
than some of the Court’s subsequent categorical invocations of terri-
toriality.75 
The methodological richness and diversity on display in the Insu-
lar Cases makes them worth considering in some detail, for the ap-
proaches they offer will recur.  The analyses in Downes v. Bidwell 76 are 
illustrative.77  Justice Brown, writing for the Court, began with the ob-
servation that textualism alone is inadequate:  “The Constitution itself 
does not answer the question.”78  Instead, “[i]ts solution must be 
found in the nature of the government created by that instrument, in 
the opinion of its contemporaries, in the practical construction put 
upon it by Congress, and in the decisions of this court.”79  The particu-
lar issue presented in Downes was whether Puerto Rico counted as part 
of the United States for the purposes of Article I, Section 8’s demand 
that duties, imposts, and excises be “uniform throughout the United 
States.”80  Brown’s analysis considered the textual distinctions the Con-
stitution makes between the United States and “place[s] subject to 
 
Kramer, Rethinking, supra note 41, at 280 (endorsing two-step analysis). 
75 In particular, the White and Brown opinions in the Insular Cases suggest to me 
an awareness that “applying” the Constitution abroad need not mean deciding cases 
with foreign elements as though they were wholly domestic.  That is, White and Brown 
are willing to grant that Congress cannot act outside the restraints of the Constitution, 
while at the same time asserting that cases with foreign elements may come out differ-
ently than they would if they were wholly domestic.  This is a crucial insight in conflicts 
theory.  See Larry Kramer, The Myth of the “Unprovided-For” Case, 75 VA. L. REV. 1045, 
1051 (1989) [hereinafter Kramer, The “Unprovided-For” Case] (“One must determine 
the rule of decision for the case actually before the court, and this may not be the rule 
used in a similar but purely domestic case.”). 
76 182 U.S. 244 (1901). 
77 Neuman’s account of Downes, see NEUMAN, supra note 56, at 85-89, is similar to 
the one offered here.  While I differ in some respects—notably my understanding of 
Justice White’s theory, see infra note 89 and accompanying text—I generally found little 
to improve on. 
78 182 U.S. at 249. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
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their jurisdiction,”81 the “object” of Section 8 and related clauses,82 and 
the history of American expansion.83  Though he concluded that 
Puerto Rico was not part of the United States for the purposes of the 
impost clause, he went on to observe that some constitutional prohibi-
tions might “go to the very root of the power of Congress to act at all” 
and therefore restrain it “irrespective of time and place.”84 
Justice White, concurring, offered the theory that would eventu-
ally win majority support.85  White started with the proposition that, as 
“every function of the government [is] derived from the Constitution, 
it follows that that instrument is everywhere and at all times potential 
in so far as its provisions are applicable.”86  To ascertain the applicabil-
ity of constitutional provisions, he suggested “an inquiry into the situa-
tion of the territory and its relations to the United States.”87  Territo-
ries that had been “incorporated into and become an integral part of 
the United States,”88 were, with respect to the availability of constitu-
tional rights, indistinguishable from the states of the Union:  all con-
stitutional provisions applied.  Unincorporated territories lay beyond 
the scope of constitutional provisions (like the impost clause) that re-
ferred to “the United States.”  But, for White, that did not mean that 
they lay beyond the Constitution entirely.  Like Brown, he offered a 
backstop of limitations on Congressional power that operated without 
respect to geography: 
Undoubtedly, there are general prohibitions in the Constitution in favor 
of the liberty and property of the citizen which are not mere regulations 
as to the form and manner in which a conceded power may be exer-
cised, but which are an absolute denial of all authority under any cir-
cumstances or conditions to do particular acts.  In the nature of things, 
 
81 Id. 
82 Id. at 278. 
83 Id. at 279. 
84 Id. at 277; see also id. at 283 (“Even if regarded as aliens, [the inhabitants of 
Puerto Rico] are entitled under the principles of the Constitution to be protected in 
life, liberty and property.”).  Brown also asserted without qualification, however, that 
“the Constitution does not apply to foreign countries or to trials therein con-
ducted . . . .”  Id. at 270.  One could say that the Justices who decided the Insular Cases 
shared the dominant territorialist premise and differed only over its application, but I 
think this would overlook the extent to which Brown and White endorsed some ver-
sion of what I will call the model of limited government.  See infra Part III.D. 
85 See Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 143-46 (1905) (adopting distinction be-
tween incorporated and unincorporated territories). 
86 Downes, 182 U.S. at 289 (White, J., concurring). 
87 Id. at 293. 
88 Id. at 299. 
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limitations of this character cannot be under any circumstances tran-
scended, because of the complete absence of power.
89
 
Chief Justice Fuller, writing for four dissenters, rejected as “occult” 
White’s distinction between incorporated and unincorporated territo-
ries, contending that in practice it amounted to the contention that 
“Congress has the power to keep [a territory], like a disembodied 
shade, in an intermediate state of ambiguous existence for an indefi-
nite period.”90  He likewise dismissed as “idle” the attempt to draw a 
“distinction between a total want of power and a defective exercise of 
it.”91 
Fuller spent most of his energies attacking Brown’s reading of 
precedent and White’s distinctions; he offered little in the way of a 
positive theory for determining the scope of the Constitution.  The 
first Justice Harlan, who joined Fuller’s dissent but also wrote sepa-
rately, did offer such a theory.  Harlan found textual support for the 
extension of the Constitution to Puerto Rico in the Supremacy Clause.  
An early draft, he observed, made the Constitution, federal laws, and 
treaties “the supreme law of the several States”; the convention had 
changed this phrase to “the supreme law of the land.”92  The amend-
ment, Harlan claimed, demonstrated an intent to “embrace[] all the 
peoples and all the territory, whether within or without the States, 
over which the United States could exercise jurisdiction or author-
ity.”93 
Harlan thus reasoned that “[t]he Constitution is supreme over 
every foot of territory, wherever situated, under the jurisdiction of the 
United States.”94  Going further—and suggesting the normative un-
derpinning of his conclusion—he asserted that “[b]y whomsoever and 
wherever power is exercised in the name and under the authority of 
 
89 Id. at 294-95.  It is now conventional to describe White’s approach as holding 
that inhabitants of unincorporated territories enjoy only “fundamental” rights.  See, 
e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 13 (1957) (describing the Insular Cases as “conceding 
that ‘fundamental’ constitutional rights applied everywhere”); NEUMAN, supra note 56, 
at 87 (“[E]ven unincorporated territories benefit from ‘inherent, although unex-
pressed, principles which are the basis of all free government . . . restrictions of so fun-
damental a nature that they cannot be transgressed.’” (quoting Downes, 182 U.S. at 
291)).  I take White’s reference to an “absence of power” more seriously and read him 
to be endorsing what I will call the model of limited government.  See infra Part III.D. 
90 Downes, 182 U.S. at 372 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting). 
91 Id. at 373. 
92 Id. at 382-83 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
93 Id. at 383. 
94 Id. at 385. 
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the United States, or of any branch of its Government, the validity or 
invalidity of that which is done must be determined by the Constitu-
tion.”95  Harlan’s ultimate position, then, seemed to be that constitu-
tional protections were triggered not by geography, nor even neces-
sarily by citizenship, but rather by the simple exercise of United States 
power.96 
Eisentrager was a less impressive performance, deploying, among 
other things, a fairly rigid territoriality.97  But in Reid v. Covert,98 the 
Court slipped the bonds of territoriality, at least with respect to 
American citizens, a full six years before the first significant judicial 
salvo of the domestic choice-of-law revolution.99  Reid considered the 
consolidated cases of two American women who had killed their ser-
vicemen husbands abroad, one in England and one in Japan.  Each 
was tried before a court martial abroad, and each sought habeas relief 
on the basis of constitutional rights to grand jury indictment and jury 
trial.100  The Court initially rejected the petitions on the theory that 
the Fifth and Sixth Amendments’ jury guarantees did not extend to 
 
95 Id.  He also rejected the distinction between constitutional provisions regulating 
power and those denoting an absence of power, see id. at 383, and, echoing Fuller, 
termed the idea of incorporation “occult,” id. at 391. 
96 See NEUMAN, supra note 56, at 87 (“Harlan unambiguously expounded a con-
ception of the Constitution based on the mutuality of legal obligation.”).  The sort of 
mutuality that Neuman endorses seems somewhat narrower than Harlan’s; Neuman 
sees only certain exercises of power as carrying with them constitutional rights.  See id. 
at 99 (“[A]liens abroad could not claim the protection of constitutional rights under 
this version of the mutuality of obligation approach every time the United States acted 
to their disadvantage.”). 
97 Though not as rigid as later cases alleged, a fact to which the Rasul Court ap-
peared sensitive.  Compare Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (citing Eisen-
trager for the proposition that the “Fifth Amendment’s protections do not extend to 
aliens outside the territorial boundaries”), with Rasul, 124 S. Ct. at 2693 (observing that 
“all six of the facts” about the status of the Eisentrager petitioners were “critical to [the 
Court’s] disposition” of the constitutional claims). 
98 354 U.S. 1 (1957). 
99 Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963), is generally considered the first 
significant judicial adoption of the new conflicts learning.  See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Same 
Sex Marriage, Conflict of Laws, and the Unconstitutional Public Policy Exception, 106 YALE L. 
J. 1965, 1992 n.105 (1997) (“[F]irst honors here are typically awarded to the New York 
Court of Appeals for its opinion in Babcock v. Jackson.” (citation omitted)).  Rumblings 
could be heard before Babcock; the same court adopted a “center of gravity” approach 
to a contracts case in 1954, see Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99, 101-02 (N.Y. 1954), and 
the Indiana Supreme Court had adopted the “significant contacts” approach (again in 
a contract action) as early as 1945, see W.H. Barber Co. v. Hughes, 63 N.E.2d 417, 423 
(Ind. 1945). 
100 See Reid, 354 U.S. at 3-5. 
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Americans tried “in foreign lands for offenses committed there” 
(though the Due Process Clause did).101 
After granting reargument, however, the Court reversed itself.  
Accidents of geography, it suggested, should not control the relation-
ship between Americans and their government.  “When the Govern-
ment reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad, the shield which 
the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution provide to pro-
tect his life and liberty should not be stripped away just because he 
happens to be in another land.”102  Like the Insular Cases, Reid contains 
no explicit invocation of conflicts theory.  But its reasoning echoes (or 
presages) the domestic rejections of territoriality.  Its ringing en-
dorsement of the relevance of citizenship is as forceful as any penned 
by Brainerd Currie,103 and its disparagement of geography would be-
come a staple of torts cases involving accidents in the course of inter-
state travel.104  Even though it does not bill itself as a conflicts case, 
Reid easily holds its own with the self-professed conflicts decisions of its 
era.105 
 
101 Id. at 5. 
102 Id. at 6. 
103 Compare id. at 6 (describing the importance of citizenship as being “as old as 
government”), with CURRIE, supra note 46, at 85 (concluding that Massachusetts is con-
cerned with the welfare of Massachusetts domiciliaries).  The domiciliary focus in do-
mestic conflicts can take on an unpleasant parochialism.  See Kilberg v. Northeast Air-
lines, Inc., 172 N.E.2d 526, 527-28 (N.Y. 1961) (“Our courts should if possible provide 
protection for our own State’s people against unfair and anachronistic treat-
ment . . . .”). 
104 Compare Reid, 354 U.S. at 6 (arguing that an American citizen’s rights “should 
not be stripped away just because he happens to be in another land”), with, e.g., Kilberg, 
172 N.E.2d at 527 (“Modern conditions make it unjust and anomalous to subject the 
traveling citizen of this State to the varying laws of other States through and over which 
they move. . . . The place of injury becomes entirely fortuitous.”). 
105 Reid also contains other approaches.  Some language echoes the Insular Cases’ 
conception of a limited government bound always by the Constitution.  See Reid, 354 
U.S. at 5-6 (“The United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution.  Its power and 
authority have no other source.  It can only act in accordance with all the limitations 
imposed by the Constitution.”); id. at 12 (rejecting the proposition that the Constitu-
tion is territorially limited as “obviously erroneous if the United States Government, 
which has no power except that granted by the Constitution, can and does try citizens 
for crimes committed abroad”).  Some language takes a textual tack.  See id. at 8 (“The 
Fifth and Sixth Amendments . . . are also all inclusive with their sweeping references to 
‘no person’ and to ‘all criminal prosecutions.’”).  Still other passages suggest that con-
stitutional rights appertain to the obligation of obedience or subject status.  See id. at 6 
(observing that English inhabitants of settled colonies “take with them . . . allegiance to 
the Crown, the duty of obedience [but also] all the rights and liberties of British Sub-
jects” (quoting 2 CHARLES M. CLODE, MILITARY FORCES OF THE CROWN; THEIR ADMINI-
STRATION AND GOVERNMENT 175 (London, John Murray 1869))). 
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This harmonious state of affairs did not persist.  Though the Su-
preme Court’s mid-century cases dealing with the scope of the Jones 
Act had abandoned territorialist reasoning sufficiently to win the ap-
proval of Brainerd Currie,106 in 1990, territorialism returned as a vig-
orous presumption for the interpretation of federal law in EEOC v. 
Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco).107  And while that decade saw lower 
federal courts relatively adventurous in enforcing constitutional rights 
in favor of aliens abroad,108 the Supreme Court seemed to be engaged 
in a similar territorialist retrenchment.  In United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez,109 the Court rejected a Mexican national’s attempt to invoke 
the exclusionary rule as a remedy for the alleged Fourth Amendment 
violation created by a warrantless search of his house in Mexico.110 
After Reid, pure territoriality was no longer an option for the Ver-
dugo-Urquidez Court, and the opinion displays some creativity in ac-
commodating that precedent.  Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the 
majority, relied in part on the Fourth Amendment’s reference to “the 
right of the people” to justify a distinction between nonresident aliens 
and “a class of persons who are part of a national community or who 
have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this country to be 
considered part of that community.”111  He also consulted the “avail-
able historical data” in an attempt to ascertain “the purpose of the 
Fourth Amendment,”112 turned to the practice of the Framers’ con-
temporaries to shed light on the original understanding,113 and toured 
the doctrine, giving special attention to the Insular Cases.114 
 
106 The cases are Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959), 
and Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953).  For Currie’s evaluation, see CURRIE, supra 
note 46, at 361-75. 
107 499 U.S. 244 (1991).  For a thorough discussion of the territorialist recrudes-
cence in Aramco, see Kramer, Vestiges, supra note 44. 
108 See, e.g., Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1326, 1342-44 (2d Cir. 
1992) (finding serious questions as to Fifth Amendment rights of Haitian refugees de-
tained in Guantanamo), vacated sub nom. Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 
918 (1993); Lamont v. Woods, 948 F.2d 825, 832-33 (2d Cir. 1991) (entertaining an 
Establishment Clause challenge to federal funding of foreign religious organizations 
located outside United States); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 856 F.2d 1214 (9th 
Cir. 1988) (excluding evidence obtained from a warrantless search of an alien’s resi-
dence abroad), rev’d, 494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
109 494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
110 Id. at 274-75. 
111 Id. at 265. 
112 Id. at 266. 
113 Id. at 267. 
114 See id. at 268-69 (“And certainly, it is not open to us in light of the Insular Cases 
to endorse the view that every constitutional provision applies wherever the United 
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The culmination of this methodological eclecticism, however, 
suggests a thwarted yearning for the simple clarity of territoriality:  
what follows in the opinion is a surprisingly univocal reading of Eisen-
trager that finds its “rejection of extraterritorial application of the Fifth 
Amendment . . . emphatic.”115  Later cases would repeat that charac-
terization, citing Eisentrager (and Verdugo-Urquidez) for the simple 
proposition that the “Fifth Amendment’s protections do not extend to 
aliens outside the territorial boundaries.”116 
Perhaps more disturbing than the return of territoriality (though 
related to it) is the one-step nature of the Court’s analysis:  the suppo-
sition that to “apply” the Constitution extraterritorially means to de-
cide cases with foreign elements as though they were wholly domes-
tic.117  That is, the majority seems to assume that in order to avoid 
granting Verdugo-Urquidez a full panoply of Fourth Amendment pro-
tections—including the exclusionary rule, which is not a constitu-
tional right at all, but rather a judicially-crafted remedy—it was re-
quired to announce that the Amendment had “no application” to 
federal action against aliens abroad.118 
 
States Government exercises its power.”). 
115 Id. at 269.  The Court did, admittedly, employ the familiar anti-territorial tactic 
of characterizing Verdugo-Urquidez’s presence in the United States as the product of 
chance.  See id. at 272 (“We do not think the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to 
the search of premises in Mexico should turn on the fortuitous circumstance of 
whether the custodian of its nonresident alien owner had or had not transported him 
to the United States at the time the search was made.”).  This, however, is simply assert-
ing the primacy of one territorial factor (location of the house) over another (location 
of the owner). 
116 Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001). 
117 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Aramco suggests a similar understanding of 
what it means to apply federal law abroad.  See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 
244, 255 (1991) (asserting that if Title VII applies abroad to govern the conduct of an 
American employer of an American citizen, it must also govern the conduct of a 
French employer of an American citizen); Kramer, Vestiges, supra note 44, at 219-20 
(making the same point). 
118 For instance, one searches the majority’s discussion of the Insular Cases in vain 
for any acknowledgement of Justice White’s assertion that “[t]he Government of the 
United States was born of the Constitution, and all powers which it enjoys or may exer-
cise must be either derived expressly or by implication from that instrument.”  Downes 
v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 288 (1901) (White, J., concurring).  Similar language does 
make an appearance in the analysis of Reid v. Covert, but it is then swept aside as apply-
ing only to citizens.  See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 270 (“Since respondent is not a 
United States citizen, he can derive no comfort from the Reid holding.”).  The separate 
concurrence of Justice Kennedy appears motivated by the desire to reject this binary 
vision and reaffirm the universal subordination of the federal government to the Con-
stitution.  See id. at 277 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[T]he Government may act only as 
the Constitution authorizes, whether the actions in question are foreign or domestic.  
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A general description of what is happening here is that the 
Court’s approach to extraterritoriality has become detached from 
modern conflicts theory.  There are two more specific components of 
the general phenomenon.  First, the Court does not seem to see extra-
territoriality cases as presenting a conflicts issue.  Only this blinkered 
perspective could have made it plausible to rely so heavily on the pre-
sumption against extraterritoriality in Aramco, almost half a century 
after territoriality had been widely rejected in domestic conflicts and 
personal jurisdiction.119  Second, when it does not see itself as deciding 
a conflicts case (and as the first point shows, it only quite rarely does), 
the Court seems to have forgotten (or decided to ignore) the choice-
of-law revolution almost entirely.120  For instance, no one familiar with 
the evolution of the Court’s conflicts jurisprudence would think that 
its early decisions constitutionalizing territoriality are good law after 
the relaxation of constitutional constraints in cases such as Clay v. Sun 
Insurance Office, Ltd.121 and Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague.122  Yet one of 
the most forceful of those early cases, New York Life Insurance Co. v. 
Head,123 resurfaced like a coelacanth in 1996, quoted at substantial 
 
But this principle is only a first step in resolving this case.” (citations omitted)). 
119
Likewise, the Court’s account of what constitutes a “conflict” between U.S. and 
foreign law in Hartford Fire Insurance Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798-99 (1993), is far 
removed from the domestic conflicts understanding, and its apparent belief in both 
Hartford Fire, see id. at 795-98, and Aramco, see 499 U.S. at 252-53, that the scope of fed-
eral law relates to the subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts is simply baffling.  See 
Larry Kramer, Extraterritorial Application of American Law After the Insurance Antitrust 
Case:  A Reply to Professors Lowenfeld and Trimble, 89 AM J. INT’L L. 750, 750 n.3 (1995) 
(discussing the Hartford Fire Court’s apparent conclusion that “the applicability of U.S. 
law and conduct abroad is a question of subject matter jurisdiction”).  For general as-
sessments of the value of conflicts thinking as applied to the question of the extraterri-
torial application of federal law, see, for example, HENRY J. STEINER ET AL., TRANSNA-
TIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 888-90 (4th ed. 1994); William S. Dodge, Extraterritoriality and 
Conflict-of-Laws Theory:  An Argument for Judicial Unilateralism, 39 HARV. INT’L L.J. 101, 
121-43 (1998); Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Public Law in the International Arena:  Conflict of 
Laws, International Law, and Some Suggestions for Their Interaction, 163 RECUIL DES COURS 
D’ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL [R.C.A.D.I.] 311, 328-29 (1979); Harold G. 
Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads:  An Intersection Between Public and Private 
International Law, 76 AM. J. INT’L L. 280, 281-85 (1982); Russell J. Weintraub, The Extra-
territorial Application of Antitrust and Securities Laws:  An Inquiry into the Utility of a “Choice-
of-Law” Approach, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1799, 1801-05 (1992). 
120 Perhaps conflicts scholars bear some of the responsibility for this; conflicts the-
ory is not considered a huge success.  And indeed, I will suggest that some standard 
conflicts approaches may not be especially helpful in determining the scope of the 
Constitution.  See infra Part III. 
121 377 U.S. 179 (1964). 
122 449 U.S. 302 (1981). 
123 234 U.S. 149 (1914). 
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length for the long-rejected proposition that extraterritorial applica-
tion of state statutes violates the Constitution.124 
Rasul does little in the way of reconnecting the Court’s analysis of 
territorial scope with conflicts theory.  Its textualist approach to de-
termining the scope of the habeas statute is certainly not a recogniz-
able conflicts methodology, and to the extent that the substance of 
the constitutional sequel can be forecast, it seems far more likely to 
focus on the special attributes of Guantanamo Bay than to take issue 
with the territorialist paradigm.  I intend to suggest that a properly 
constituted conflicts theory could be useful in resolving the constitu-
tional issue, but before considering conflicts, it is worth looking a bit 
more closely at the techniques the Court has been using.  The preced-
ing discussion has been little more than a chronological tour of the 
case law, and a somewhat disorganized one at that.  Reconciling the 
various decisions is no easy task—indeed, I suspect it is impossible—
because they reflect and embody quite different theories of extraterri-
toriality.125  Rather than attempt a synthesis, the following Part extracts 
those theories and assesses them individually. 
One test of theory is its fit with practice.  That criterion is of lim-
ited utility here; precisely because the Court has not been consistent 
in its methodology, we cannot expect any model to capture the doc-
trine perfectly.  We may, however, demand at least moderate consis-
tency with settled law, and we may test the approaches on the basis of 
their ability to resolve the question of extraterritorial scope in an intel-
lectually coherent way.126 
 
124  
[I]t would be impossible to permit the statutes of Missouri to operate beyond 
the jurisdiction of that State . . . without throwing down the constitutional 
barriers by which all the States are restricted within the orbits of their lawful 
authority and upon the preservation of which the Government under the 
Constitution depends. This is so obviously the necessary result of the Constitu-
tion that it has rarely been called in question and hence authorities directly 
dealing with it do not abound. 
BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 571 n.16 (1996) (quoting Head, 234 U.S. at 
161). 
125 See NEUMAN, supra note 56, at 97 (“In the case of American constitutionalism, 
conflicting conceptions of geographical scope have led to serious indeterminacy in the 
modern period.”). 
126 See id. at 98 (“The question of scope must be resolved primarily by deliberative 
choice among alternative approaches on the basis of their normative characteristics 
and their coherence with less unsettled constitutional practices.”). 
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III.  THEORY:  APPROACHES TO EXTRATERRITORIALITY 
The task to which I turn in this Part—isolating and evaluating the 
different approaches that different Justices have offered to the ques-
tion of the extraterritorial scope of the Constitution—has been per-
formed before.  Most notably, Gerald Neuman’s book Strangers to the 
Constitution, and its predecessor article Whose Constitution?, set out a 
taxonomy that includes four different models:  universalism, member-
ship, mutuality, and global due process.127  I am fortunate not to be 
writing on a blank slate, and I have benefited greatly from Neuman’s 
work.  My own reconstruction differs from his in significant respects, 
however:  I include universalism, membership, and mutuality, but add 
territoriality (which Neuman considers part of mutuality) and replace 
global due process with limited government, a related model that I 
think better captures the intellectual history of the relevant argu-
ments.  (These distinctions will become clear later.)  I also attempt a 
more critical evaluation of the models.  Many of them, I will suggest, 
have much less resolving power than is commonly supposed, and 
some turn out to beg the question entirely. 
A.  Universalism/Textualism 
The simplest approach to extraterritoriality would be to take the 
Constitution’s text as a sufficient guide.  Some constitutional provi-
sions specify limitations on their scope, either geographical or per-
sonal.  The impost clause at issue in Downes, for instance, applies only 
to taxes “throughout the United States,”128 and the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s equal protection clause makes specific reference to the 
“jurisdiction” of the states.129  Likewise, the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause appears to restrict its protection to “citizens of the United 
 
127 See id. at 4-8; Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 100 YALE L.J. 909, 915-21 
(1991).  The article refers to the mutuality model as “municipal law”; I have chosen to 
focus on the book as the more recent statement of Neuman’s analysis.  No discussion 
of models of constitutional analysis would be complete without an acknowledgement 
of Philip Bobbitt’s extremely helpful taxonomy of constitutional argument.  See PHILIP 
BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE:  THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 7, 93 (1982).  Bob-
bitt identifies six modes of argument:  textual, historical, structural, doctrinal, pruden-
tial, and ethical.  The preceding discussion of the case law shows that these modes may 
be employed in the service of various different positions, and this Part will demonstrate 
that they are not tied to particular theoretical approaches to extraterritoriality either.  
(For instance, although I call one approach textualism, textual argument may be made 
in support of the social contract/membership approach as well.  See infra Part III.C.) 
128 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
129 Id.  amend. XIV. 
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States.”130  A textualist, or at least one who believed textualism to be 
the only permissible interpretive methodology, might then approach 
the problem of scope by reasoning that constitutional provisions with-
out textual limitations are available to anyone, regardless of citizenship 
or geography. 
The textualist model (which Neuman refers to as “Universal-
ism”)131 has never enjoyed much support among the Justices.132  A sig-
nificant number have employed textualism as one among other 
methodologies—Justices Brown and Harlan in Downes,133 Justice Black 
in Reid,134 and Justices Rehnquist and Brennan in Verdugo-Urquidez135—
but the analysis is more commonly used to narrow rights, rather than 
to extend them, the counterexamples being Reid and the dissenting 
opinions of Harlan and Brennan in Downes and Verdugo-Urquidez.  The 
Rasul Court’s embrace of textualism in setting the scope of the habeas 
statute might give textualism a boost, but it would be an undeserved 
one. 
As already noted, conflicts problems typically arise precisely be-
cause legislatures do not specify the geographical or personal scope of 
their statutes.  To decide that such statutes (or, in the constitutional 
context, such provisions as the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process 
Clause) are therefore unlimited in scope is abdication, not analysis.  
Textualism does indeed tell us how to resolve the question—
something I will argue some other models do not—but it does not tell 
us how to do so in a sensible way.136 
 
130 Id.  One might also read the phrase “privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States” to identify the class of rights protected against abridgement, rather than 
the class of rights-holders—that is, to indicate that the relevant privileges and immuni-
ties were those held against the United States under federal law, rather than the state-
law privileges and immunities referenced in Article IV.  Cf. The Slaughter-House Cases, 
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 119-20 (1873) (Bradley, J., dissenting) (noting that Bill of Rights 
guarantees and others “are specified in the original Constitution, or in the early 
amendments of it, as among the privileges and immunities of citizens of the United 
States”). 
131 See NEUMAN, supra note 56, at 5-6 (describing an approach with no limitations 
on people or places covered by the Constitution). 
132 See id. at 6 (admitting that it has “played almost no role in American constitu-
tionalism until recent years”). 
133 See Downes, 182 U.S. at 251; id. at 382-83 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
134 See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1957). 
135 See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990); id. at 283 n.7 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
136 Neuman, consistent with his preference for mutuality, faults universalism for 
suggesting that the United States would be required to respect the rights of aliens 
abroad “in all the contexts in which it interacts with them; not just when it seeks to ap-
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B. Territoriality 
Territoriality suggests that as each sovereign is supreme within its 
geographical borders, its law, all of its law, and only its law, is there in 
force.  The Constitution, then, could be invoked by persons within 
(some definition of) the United States, and not by anyone else.  This 
model can claim at least an historical ascendance and, perhaps, a re-
newed modern appeal.  (There are second acts in the lives of Ameri-
can constitutional doctrines.)  Certainly, no rival conception can boast 
such repeated and unqualified endorsement by the Supreme Court.137 
On the other hand, no other approach has the defect of being so 
demonstrably false.  Territoriality, in domestic conflicts and interna-
tional law, was understood not as a sensible way to allocate legislative 
jurisdiction (though some digging can get you there138) but rather as a 
limit on the power of legislatures, imposed domestically by the Consti-
tution and internationally by the law of nations.  Practice proved the 
premise false; neither constraint held up, and if Congress and state 
legislatures can project power beyond their borders, so too can We 
the People.139  Perhaps more significant, territoriality suffered a crip-
 
ply its law, but also when it exercises military force against them or interacts consensu-
ally in a commercial or foreign aid context.”  NEUMAN, supra note 56, at 110.  I will 
suggest later that concerns about war—which have been raised by almost everyone with 
whom I have discussed this issue—are significantly overstated.  See infra notes 205-07 
and accompanying text.  Foreign aid is a more difficult issue, and I think it is probably 
a good illustration of (though hardly the only reason) why pure textualism is a silly ap-
proach. 
137 See, e.g., Ross v. McIntyre, 140 U.S 453, 464-65 (1891); Am. Banana Co. v. 
United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1909); N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149, 
163-64 (1914). 
138 See supra Part II; Kramer, Vestiges, supra note 44, at 187-88 (describing territori-
ality as a method of accommodating conflicting policies).  Kramer points to its rela-
tively egalitarian allocation of authority as a selling point; another, more salient to the 
judicial mind, might be its ease of application.  Though determining the location of an 
event can prove surprisingly complex, territoriality does allow judges to avoid the diffi-
cult task of deciding how domestic law should interact with, and perhaps be altered by, 
foreign law when it is applied to events occurring outside the borders of a state or na-
tion.  See infra note 214 and accompanying text. 
139 One might nonetheless attempt to defend territoriality as the original under-
standing, but this is less than fully convincing.  The Framers doubtless understood the 
scope of the Constitution in territorialist terms, but no more so than the scope of na-
tional power more generally, and they could as plausibly be characterized as under-
standing that the Constitution would follow the exercise of such power, or even that it 
should have the maximum scope possible.  Neuman, in fact, characterizes territoriality 
as a version of the mutuality approach.  See NEUMAN, supra note 56, at 7.  I do not, on 
the grounds that territoriality was initially understood to be based on the limits of sov-
ereign power rather than mutuality, and that it departs from mutuality in its modern 
applications. 
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pling blow in Reid v. Covert; as long as Americans abroad enjoy consti-
tutional protection (a position the Court is not likely to abandon), 
territoriality will not fit the doctrine.  Still, territoriality could be recast 
as merely a sensible approach, not a necessary restraint, and given the 
Court’s inability to settle on a particular theory, demanding a perfect 
fit with existing case law is surely asking too much.  It is worthwhile, 
then, to consider territoriality on its own merits. 
From a more theoretical perspective, territoriality faces additional 
challenges.  First, as Currie took great pains to point out, it is not a 
consistently sensible way of determining the scope of a law.140  Second, 
territoriality is somewhat question-begging.  Grant that the Constitu-
tion “applies” within the borders of the United States.  Does that 
mean that cases involving aliens arising within the U.S. should be re-
solved as though they were entirely domestic—i.e., as though the alien 
were a citizen?  Territoriality, as a one-step approach, suggests that the 
answer is yes, which aligns it with the cases holding that even unlawful 
entrants enjoy constitutional rights.141 
That may be a normatively desirable and intellectually supportable 
answer, but territoriality provides it only by fiat.142  The reservation of 
some benefits to citizens is common.  It is not unimaginable that the 
purposes of the Constitution would be better served by denying some 
protections to unlawful or involuntary entrants, perhaps those who 
have entered the country in order to make war on it143 or those we 
have deemed enemies and brought within our borders for incapacita-
tion or punishment.144  (There would, of course, remain the antece-
 
140 See CURRIE, supra note 46, at 180-81 (arguing that “[t]he territorialist concep-
tion has been directly responsible for indefensible results”); see also, e.g., Kramer, Ves-
tiges, supra note 44, at 210-11 (“Indeed, while much of modern conflicts theory remains 
unsettled, if anything is established, it is that across-the-board territoriality is a poor 
system for resolving conflicts.”). 
141 See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (noting that “once an alien 
enters the country, the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies 
to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here 
is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent”) and cases there cited. 
142 Eisentrager attempted to offer a somewhat more complete justification, that 
presence implied protection.  But the logic of this rationale is limited—and Eisentrager 
did limit it—to those who have entered lawfully, and perhaps excludes involuntary en-
trants as well.  See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 770 (1950) (“[L]awful presence 
in the country creates an implied assurance of safe conduct and gives [the alien] cer-
tain rights . . . .”). 
143 Cf. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 47-48 (1942) (holding, on the basis of petition-
ers’ undisputed status as unlawful belligerents, that they could be tried by military tri-
bunals rather than civil courts). 
144 But see United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 278 (1990) (Kennedy, 
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dent problem of what rights these people could assert in the effort to 
prove that they did not fit the category into which the government 
placed them.)  Or rather, to look at the matter from the opposite side, 
if there is a good reason that such people should have constitutional 
rights within the U.S., it is hard to see why it should make a difference 
that the government has (fortuitously or strategically) elected to hold 
them outside its borders.  With such a lengthy list of defects, territori-
ality should not be an appealing model. 
C.  Social Contract/Membership 
A textualist who started her close reading at the beginning of the 
Constitution would find what appears to be a highly useful indicator 
as to its scope and purpose in the Preamble: 
 We the People of the United States, in order to form a more perfect 
Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the 
common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Bless-
ings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish 
this Constitution for the United States of America.
145
 
Justices have indeed relied on the Preamble to argue for limits on 
constitutional scope.  Ross v. McIntyre, somewhat surprisingly, used it 
to fund a territorialist approach, arguing that “[b]y the constitution a 
government is ordained and established ‘for the United States of 
America,’ and not for countries outside of their limits.”146  This version 
of the social contract theory seems to beg the question (though only 
slightly more obviously than do others):  grant that the Constitution 
empowers and restrains only the government of the United States; 
why does it follow that it restrains the government only within the 
United States?  There is no obvious answer to this question, and the 
social contract theory is more commonly used (as Neuman’s term 
“membership” suggests)147 to restrict rights to citizens. 
 
J., concurring) (“All would agree, for instance, that the dictates of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment protect the defendant.”).  Justice Rehnquist’s majority 
opinion could in fact be read to suggest that illegal aliens enjoy lesser rights.  See id. at 
282 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (expressing alarm at the implication); cf. Fong Yue Ting 
v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 738 (1893) (Brewer, J., dissenting) (“The Constitution 
has no extraterritorial effect, and those who have not come lawfully within our terri-
tory cannot claim any protection from its provisions.”). 
145 U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
146 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891). 
147 See NEUMAN, supra note 56, at 6-7 (discussing social contract theory under the 
rubric of “Membership Models”). 
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Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Verdugo-Urquidez is perhaps the 
most notable example.  In a portion of the opinion disavowed by Jus-
tice Kennedy, Rehnquist read “the people” referenced in the Fourth 
Amendment as related to the “People” of the Preamble:  “a class of 
persons who are part of a national community or who have otherwise  
developed sufficient connection with this country to be considered 
part of that community.”148 
Rehnquist’s argument relates to the Fourth Amendment specifi-
cally, but the Preamble could be taken to support a more general ap-
proach.  The Constitution declares itself to be established to secure 
the blessings of liberty for a limited class:  the People and their “Pos-
terity.”  It seems plausible, then, to reason that the benefits of the 
Constitution are generally reserved for the People—not the ratifiers 
and their biological descendants, of course, but the American com-
munity Rehnquist described.  Some constitutional provisions explicitly 
reject this restriction, notably the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause, which specifically extends to all persons within the 
jurisdiction of the States,149 but those may be considered exceptions 
that prove the rule:  absent such a clear textual indicator, the back-
ground membership assumption should control. 
From this perspective, it might seem clear that aliens abroad 
should not enjoy constitutional rights.  Neither, as Rehnquist inti-
mated in Verdugo-Urquidez, should illegal entrants, and indeed the 
rights of lawful resident aliens might seem to be in some jeopardy.  
Neuman calls this model Hobbesian in its implications, and it quite 
neatly tracks Hobbes’s pronouncement that “the Infliction of what 
evill soever, on an Innocent man, that is not a Subject, if it be for the 
benefit of the Commonwealth, and without violation of any former 
Covenant, is no breach of the Law of Nature.”150 
A first problem with the membership model is that, in its most un-
compromising version, it does not fit our doctrine, which does extend 
constitutional rights to illegal aliens, involuntary entrants, and even 
aliens abroad who are defendants in civil suits.151  Responses are avail-
 
148 Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265.  For Kennedy’s disavowal, see id. at 276. 
149 See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 211-14 (1982) (relying on the text of the 
Equal Protection Clause to protect undocumented aliens). 
150 See NEUMAN, supra note 56, at 109 (quoting THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 360 
(C.B. McPherson ed. 1985) (1651)). 
151 See NEUMAN, supra note 56, at 113 (noting that American courts observe consti-
tutional limitations when trying nonresident alien defendants).  For an interesting dis-
cussion of the Due Process rights of nonresident alien defendants, see Lea Brilmayer & 
Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality and Fifth Amendment Due Process, 105 HARV. L. 
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able.  One might argue that this signals that the doctrine should be 
revised, a position that probably has its supporters.  More plausibly, 
one might point out that it is quite likely in the interest of citizens to 
extend constitutional rights to some categories of aliens.152 
But at this point the question-begging aspect of the membership 
model becomes apparent.  Grant that the Constitution exists and ex-
tends rights only for the benefit of the People.  Why does it follow that 
it extends rights only to the People?  Of course, it does not.  The Peo-
ple might worry that ruthless treatment of aliens by their own gov-
ernment would expose them to equally ruthless treatment at the 
hands of foreign powers.153  They might think it beneficial to extend 
constitutional rights as a means of encouraging commerce and immi-
gration.154  They might worry that a government that had experienced 
the exercise of totally unchecked power against aliens would prove a 
greater danger to citizens.  Or they might simply be repulsed by the 
idea of the government—their agent—acting in their name with no 
obligation to observe even the most fundamental norms of decency 
and fairness.155 
These issues are familiar from conflicts, where they surface in the 
debate over how to determine state interests.  Currie’s early work pos-
 
REV. 1217, 1223 (1992).  NEUMAN, supra note 56, at 11-12, also observes that Hobbism 
comes at the price of delegitimating claims that aliens have an obligation to obey U.S. 
law, but I fear I am too much of a positivist to find this consideration particularly 
weighty. 
152 Madison presented this argument in the course of opposing the Alien Act, as 
Neuman describes.  See NEUMAN, supra note 56, at 59 (characterizing Madison as argu-
ing that “[t]he rights (natural or otherwise) of aliens and of citizens are intertwined, 
and oppression of aliens could indirectly harm citizens”). 
153 See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of Retired Military Officers in Support of Petition-
ers at 25, Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004) (Nos. 03-334, 03-343) (“[T]he lives of 
captured American military forces may well be endangered by the United States’ fail-
ure to grant foreign prisoners in its custody the same rights that the United States in-
sists be accorded to American prisoners held by foreigners.”), available at 2004 WL 
99346; Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 285 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“By respecting the 
rights of foreign nationals, we encourage other nations to respect the rights of our citi-
zens.”). 
154 See NEUMAN, supra note 56, at 59 (“Arbitrary government power over aliens 
would disrupt and discourage desired relations between aliens and citizens, whether 
marriage, friendship, commerce, or education.”). 
155 See, e.g., Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 286 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Our na-
tional interest is defined by [our moral] values and by the need to preserve our own 
just institutions.”); A Statement of Conscience:  Not in Our Name, at http:// 
www.nion.us/NION.htm (last modified Apr. 15, 2003) (“We believe that all persons 
detained or prosecuted by the United States government should have the same rights 
of due process.”). 
  
2005] RASUL AND BEYOND 2049 
ited, for illustrative purposes, a “selfish state,” interested only in the 
welfare of its own citizens.156  Currie himself acknowledged that states 
might pursue more enlightened policies, and it was soon pointed out 
that considerations of reciprocity and game theory might lead even 
the most selfish state to moderate its assertions of authority and re-
strictions of rights.157  The premise that the Constitution exists only for 
the benefit of Americans, in short, tells us very little about whether 
and under what circumstances it extends rights to aliens. 
This is not a reason to reject the membership model.  It is rather a 
demonstration that selecting the membership model does not in fact 
determine the scope of the Constitution.  There remains the question 
of what scope best promotes the interests of the American People—a 
question that, interestingly enough, is familiar from the conflict of 
laws.158  I will suggest that this question is indeed the fundamental one, 
and that it can usefully be addressed by the methodology of conflicts.  
For present purposes, however, it is enough to conclude that the 
membership model does not provide an answer. 
D.  Limited Government/Global Due Process 
If the question of what constitutional rights aliens possess proves 
knotty, an analysis that does not work in terms of rights might seem an 
attractive alternative.  Rather than identifying rights that defeat the 
exercise of government power, one could seek out limitations on that 
power.  If the government simply lacks the power to take a certain act, 
considerations of geography and citizenship might seem irrelevant, 
and the question of who bears particular rights can be avoided. 
Invocations of limited government are common in the extraterri-
toriality case law.  Justice Brown in Downes acknowledged the existence 
 
156 See CURRIE, supra note 46, at 89 (assuming a “selfish state” to examine hypo-
thetical conflict of laws cases). 
157 See id. (arguing that even for the state seeking to maximize its own interests, 
applying foreign law would sometimes be rational).  For the suggestion that game the-
ory will lead to cooperation, see Kramer, Rethinking, supra note 41, at 343-44. 
158 In its constitutional guise, the question may be somewhat more freighted.  A 
judge attempting to divine state interests, as Currie noted, is always subject to the “ad-
vice of those who know better”—namely state legislatures.  CURRIE, supra note 46, at 
592 (emphasis omitted).  Legislative correction is a real possibility; for instance, after 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Aramco, Congress amended Title VII to specify extra-
territorial scope.  See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 109, 105 Stat. 
1071, 1077-78 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(f), 2000e-1).  Correction by the People, 
on the other hand, requires the much more difficult process of constitutional amend-
ment. 
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of “such prohibitions as go to the very root of the power of Congress 
to act at all, irrespective of time or place,” and observed that “when 
the Constitution declares that ‘no bill of attainder or ex post facto law 
shall be passed,’ and that ‘no title of nobility shall be granted by the 
United States,’ it goes to the competency of Congress to pass a bill of 
that description.”159  Justice White, likewise, asserted that “those absolute 
withdrawals of power which the Constitution has made in favor of 
human liberty are applicable to every condition or status.”160  More re-
cently, Justice Brennan’s dissent in Verdugo-Urquidez argued that “[t]he 
focus of  the Fourth Amendment is on what the Government can and 
cannot do, and how it may act, not on against whom these actions may 
be taken.”161 
The idea that individual liberty is secured by limited government 
has a distinguished pedigree.  The Federalists argued that an explicit 
bill of rights to protect particular freedoms was unnecessary, as the 
government had been given no power to invade them.  The Constitu-
tion itself, they asserted, was a bill of rights.162  It might seem, then, 
that an analysis based on the limited powers of the federal govern-
ment offers a way to impose at least some restraints on governmental 
action against aliens abroad. 
In fact, however, matters turn out to be a good deal more compli-
cated.  We may grant for argument’s sake the Federalist claim that the 
national government has not been given the power to invade funda-
mental liberties and, its corollary, that the Bill of Rights is largely de-
claratory.  Aliens abroad are not protected by this line of reasoning—
at least, not protected to the same extent as citizens invoking Bill of 
Rights guarantees—without the further premise that the federal gov-
ernment wields no power in its conduct of foreign affairs that it does 
not wield domestically.  And that premise, of course, runs headlong 
 
159 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 277 (1901). 
160 Id. at 297-98 (White, J., concurring). 
161 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 288 (1990) (Brennan, J., dis-
senting); see also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957) (stating that “[t]he United States 
is entirely a creature of the Constitution.  Its power and authority have no other 
source.  It can only act in accordance with all the limitations imposed by the Constitu-
tion” (citations omitted)); Lamont v. Woods, 948 F.2d 825, 834-35 (2d Cir. 1991) (rely-
ing on Downes for the proposition that “the constitutional prohibition against estab-
lishments of religion targets the competency of Congress to enact legislation of that 
description—irrespective of time or place”). 
162 See THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 515 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961) (“The truth is, after all the declamations we have heard, that the Constitution is 
itself, in every rational sense, and to every useful purpose, A BILL OF RIGHTS.”). 
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into United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,163 where Justice Suther-
land famously announced that the federal foreign affairs power was 
inherent in sovereignty and not dependent on the Constitution for its 
source.164 
The source and scope of the foreign affairs power is an area of in-
tense controversy, and Curtiss-Wright is a favorite academic target.165  
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court continues to cite it,166 and “[m]ost 
scholars assume that Congress has a general power to legislate in for-
eign affairs matters.”167  This power is not, of course, superior to con-
stitutional rights,168 but it is a general power of the sort wielded by 
state legislatures or by Congress in regulating the territories,169 rather 
than the discrete set of enumerated powers granted to the federal 
government in domestic affairs.  That sets the bar substantially higher, 
 
163 299 U.S. 304 (1936). 
164 “The broad statement that the federal government can exercise no powers ex-
cept those specifically enumerated in the Constitution, and such implied powers as are 
necessary and proper to carry into effect the enumerated powers, is categorically true 
only in respect of our internal affairs.”  Id. at 315-16. 
165 See Michael D. Ramsey, The Myth of Extraconstitutional Foreign Affairs Power, 42 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 379, 380 & n.6 (2000) (stating that “[m]uch academic labor has 
been devoted to proving Curtiss-Wright wrong” and citing examples).  A fierce debate 
over similar inherent powers arose earlier in the context of anti-Chinese immigration 
legislation, and the Court adopted a position similar to that of Justice Sutherland.  See, 
e.g., Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 711 (1893) (characterizing “[t]he 
right to exclude or to expel all aliens, or any class of aliens, absolutely or upon certain 
conditions, in war or in peace” as “an inherent and inalienable right of every sovereign 
and independent nation”).  The assertion of inherent power provoked a fierce dissent 
from Justice Field, who protested that “[t]he existence of the power thus stated is only 
consistent with the admission that the government is one of unlimited and despotic 
power, so far as aliens domiciled in the country are concerned.”  Id. at 755-56 (Field, J., 
dissenting).  Even accepting that complete power over immigration is an inherent as-
pect of sovereignty, a question remains:  since in America the people, and not the gov-
ernment, are sovereign, where is the evidence that this power has been entirely dele-
gated to the government?  See NEUMAN, supra note 56, at 121 (asserting that this theory 
“conflated the sovereignty of the nation with the power of the federal government”). 
166 See, e.g., Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 188 (1993) (citing Cur-
tiss-Wright in support of presidential discretion in foreign affairs); Toll v. Moreno, 458 
U.S. 1, 10 (1982) (citing Curtiss-Wright for federal government’s “broad authority over 
foreign affairs”); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 977 
(3d ed. 2000) (noting, critically, “[t]he traditional international perspective—that in-
ternal limits on the powers of national governments are without significance to foreign 
affairs”). 
167 Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Af-
fairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 233 (2001). 
168 See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 416 n.9 (2003) (noting that even 
on the Curtiss-Wright understanding, federal power remains “[s]ubject . . . to the Con-
stitution’s guarantees of individual rights”). 
169 See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3. 
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for it means that a limited government analysis could not take the 
form of modern “liberty-preserving” limited government decisions 
such as the Court’s recent federalism cases.170  It would have to identify 
inherent and necessary limitations on governmental authority rather 
than the lack of a textual basis for the exercise of power. 
That requirement does not doom the project, for the Supreme 
Court has frequently invoked just such limits.  The model can be 
traced as far back as Justice Chase’s opinion in Calder v. Bull,171 which 
asserted that the “purposes for which men enter into society will de-
termine the nature and terms of the social compact . . . as they are the 
foundation of the legislative power, they will decide what are the 
proper objects of it:  The nature, and ends of legislative power will 
limit the exercise of it.”172  Thus, Chase’s analysis did not rely on af-
firmative rights but, rather, absences of power.  There were some 
things, he reasoned, that the people forming a government would 
simply not want that government to do, and they would not delegate it 
the necessary power.  “[I]t is against all reason and justice,” he wrote, 
“for a people to intrust [sic] a legislature with such powers; and there-
fore, it cannot be presumed that they have done it.”173 
This style of reasoning exerted significant influence in the extra-
territoriality context in the early twentieth century, as the Insular Cases 
demonstrate.  It blossomed in the police power cases of the Lochner 
era, during which the Court aggressively patrolled the boundaries of 
legislative authority.174  And while the Lochner jurisprudence has lost its 
 
170 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000); United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995). 
171 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798). 
172 Id. at 388; see also Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 135 (1810) (“It may 
well be doubted whether the nature of society and of government does not prescribe 
some limits to the legislative power . . . .”). 
173 Calder, 3 U.S. at 388. 
174 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).  For a pathbreaking study of the 
Lochner era that sees it as concerned with the proper scope of the police power, see 
HOWARD GILLMAN, THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED:  THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER 
ERA POLICE POWERS JURISPRUDENCE 20 (1993).  For similar accounts, see, for example, 
BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT:  THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTI-
TUTIONAL REVOLUTION 6-7 (1998); G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE 
NEW DEAL 243-44 (2000).  A contrary account, which sees the issue as one of rights, 
rather than absences of power, may be found in David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revi-
sionism, Revised:  Lochner and the Origins of Fundamental-Rights Constitutionalism, 92 GEO. 
L.J. 1, 12 (2003).  The analysis of Lochner speaks explicitly of the limits of legislative 
power.  See 198 U.S. at 58 (“We think the limit of the police power has been reached 
and passed in this case.”).  Perhaps more tellingly, Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 
(1897), the case frequently cited for the creation of a fundamental right to contract, 
  
2005] RASUL AND BEYOND 2053 
luster, the limited power refrain continues to be heard, both in lower 
court extraterritoriality decisions175 and, though not with the utmost 
clarity, in the Supreme Court itself.176 
How could a modern Court discern the limits of federal power?  
The Lochner Court found its textual hook in the Due Process Clause, 
and a similar methodology exists in the Insular Cases.177  More recently, 
other Justices have endorsed an approach that asks whether federal 
action against aliens abroad violates due process,178 and so this might 
seem a viable way to proceed.179 
Again, however, things are more complicated than they first ap-
pear.  The Lochner-era Court’s vision of a government limited to the 
evenhanded pursuit of the public interest,180 or at least its vision of the 
 
deals with an attempt by Louisiana to regulate an insurance contract entered into in 
New York, and was decided on the grounds that Louisiana lacked the power to legislate 
extraterritorially.  (It was not questioned, for example, that New York could have regu-
lated the contract.)  See id. at 588 (noting that “the contract was made in New York, 
outside the jurisdiction of Louisiana”); id. at 591 (noting that a state’s power “does not 
and cannot extend to prohibiting a citizen from making contracts of the nature in-
volved in this case outside of the limits and jurisdiction of the state, and which are also 
to be performed outside of such jurisdiction”).  That Allgeyer is in fact a conflicts case 
has been noted.  See, e.g., Michael G. Collins, October Term, 1896—Embracing Due Process, 
45 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 71, 85-87 (2001) (looking at Allgeyer from a “choice-of-law angle” 
and noting the decision’s “distinctly procedural flavor”); David P. Currie, The Constitu-
tion in the Supreme Court:  The Protection of Economic Interests 1889-1910, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 
324, 378 (1985) (“In any event, Allgeyer was a choice-of-law decision, not, strictly speak-
ing, a substantive one.”). 
175 See Lamont v. Woods, 948 F.2d 825, 832-33 (2d Cir. 1991). 
176 In Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), the Court struck down a Texas law 
prohibiting same-sex sodomy not on the grounds that it infringed on any preferred 
right but rather that it “further[ed] no legitimate state interest which can justify its in-
trusion into the personal and private life of the individual,” a statement that would 
seem to place the law outside the bounds of legislative power.  Id. at 578.  For scholarly 
assessments of Lawrence, see, for example, Laurence Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas:  The 
“Fundamental Right” that Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1898 (2004) 
(suggesting that Lawrence is best understood as a fundamental rights model). 
177 See Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 282-83 (1901).  Justice Brown did, addi-
tionally, suggest that the prohibitions of Article I, Section 9 indicated absences of 
power, as, perhaps, did the First Amendment.  See id. at 277. 
178 See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 75 (1957) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[O]ne can 
say, in fact, that the question of which specific safeguards of the Constitution are ap-
propriately to be applied in a particular context overseas can be reduced to the issue of 
what process is ‘due’ a defendant in the particular circumstances of a particular 
case.”); United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 278 (1990) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (same, quoting Harlan). 
179 Thus the model of limited government evolves into what Neuman calls “global 
due process.”  NEUMAN, supra note 56, at 8. 
180 See generally sources cited supra note 174 (analyzing the fundamental concerns 
of the Lochner-era Court). 
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judiciary as a branch of government competent to define and defend 
this boundary, is gone.  After United States v. Carolene Products,181 West 
Coast Hotel v. Parrish,182 and Ferguson v. Skrupa,183 the general under-
standing is that the legislature is superior to the judiciary in the de-
termination of the public interest, for reasons of both institutional 
competence and democratic accountability.184  Lawrence aside, it is rare 
for a court to find an absence of governmental power.  Instead, a per-
son seeking to resist governmental action must usually invoke a right 
sufficient to overcome the exercise of government power.185  And in-
deed, modern due process jurisprudence is typically concerned with 
what rights are contained in the Due Process Clause, rather than the 
limits of governmental power.186 
At first blush, this changed understanding might seem to be a 
boon to aliens abroad.  If due process is the issue, and the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause has been held to incorporate most 
of the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights, why not apply this un-
derstanding to Fifth Amendment Due Process (which has already 
shown sufficient appetite to incorporate equal protection) and con-
clude that aliens abroad possess all the Bill of Rights guarantees that 
bind the states? 
This line of reasoning might seem excessively clever, but there is a 
very real link between the Insular Cases and those dealing with applica-
 
181 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
182 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
183 372 U.S. 726 (1963). 
184 See also, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (“Subject to specific con-
stitutional limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been 
declared in terms well-nigh conclusive.”). 
185 I hope the distinction between the analytical structure of the two arguments 
(absence of power as opposed to right defeating power) is clear.  In case it is not, con-
sider this:  Antonio Morrison’s victory against the United States in Morrison clearly did 
not depend on any right to rape Christy Brzonkala (though that was the liberty the 
Court protected), but rather on the absence of power in the federal government to 
regulate his behavior.  See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (noting 
that any remedy “must be provided by the Commonwealth of Virginia, and not by the 
United States”).  Likewise, the Louisiana statute at issue in Allgeyer, see supra note 174 
and accompanying text, was held not to constitute due process of law because it was 
unconstitutional for reasons unrelated to liberty of contract—namely that its extrater-
ritorial scope exceeded the power of the legislature.  By contrast, modern cases featur-
ing constitutional challenges to state action typically ask whether an affirmative right 
(under, for example, the First Amendment) defeats the exercise of state power. 
186 This is so even where the text of the relevant constitutional provision—for in-
stance, the First Amendment—suggests an absence of power rather than the presence 
of a countervailing right. 
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tion of the Bill of Rights against the states.187  In Hawaii v. Mankichi,188 
Justice White concurred with the majority’s conclusion that inhabi-
tants of Hawaii189 need not be afforded the grand and petit jury rights 
of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments on the grounds that these rights 
were not sufficiently fundamental.190  He cited as support Hurtado v. 
California,191 which held that the Due Process Clause did not require 
states to proceed by grand jury indictments.  Justice Harlan dissented 
in both cases on the grounds that jury trial rights were fundamental in 
their nature.192  Identifying fundamental due process rights worthy of 
extraterritorial application might well proceed parallel to the incor-
poration of such rights against the states. 
Still, a problem remains, and a serious one:  the transition to a 
rights-centered understanding destroys the promised benefits of the 
model of limited government.  If the question is whether governmen-
tal action comports with due process, and we have adopted the mod-
ern understanding of due process as a matter not of an absence of 
government power but of affirmative rights against that power, we 
have in fact come full circle.  Due process rights are rights like any 
others; they may be granted to some people and withheld from oth-
ers, depending upon factors such as geography and citizenship.  Em-
 
187 In each case, the limited government analysis essentially asks, in the manner of 
Justice Chase, whether reasonable people would give their government the power to 
perform a certain act.  Application of the Bill of Rights to the states eventually came to 
be governed instead by an analysis that asked whether the asserted right was “funda-
mental.”  See AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:  CREATION AND RECONSTRUC-
TION 139-40 (1998) (describing “selective incorporation”).  Likewise, the Insular Cases 
now tend to be understood as adopting an approach that turned on the fundamental-
ity of the right at issue.  See id. at 276-77 (describing “the little-noted link” between the 
incorporation and extension of the Bill of Rights to territories).  Amar’s brilliant analy-
sis of the incorporation debate suggests that although it is correct to address incorpo-
ration right-by-right, fundamentality is not the correct criterion.  Instead, the relevant 
question is whether the right at issue is “a personal privilege . . . of individual citizens, 
rather than a right of states or the public at large.”  See id. at 218-23.  Similarly, I shall 
argue, one considering extraterritorial application of the Bill of Rights should not in-
quire into fundamentality but rather ask whether extending a particular right to this 
new context will serve its domestic purpose.  See infra text accompanying notes 225-26. 
188 190 U.S. 197 (1903). 
189 Mankichi himself was a Japanese national, see id. at 234 (Harlan, J., dissenting), 
but his lack of citizenship played no role in the Court’s decision. 
190 Id. at 221 (White, J., concurring). 
191 110 U.S. 516 (1884). 
192 See Mankichi, 190 U.S. at 244-45 (Harlan, J., dissenting); Hurtado, 110 U.S. at 
545-46 (Harlan, J., dissenting).  See generally NEUMAN, supra note 56, at 88 (observing 
that “Harlan’s literal demands continued his ongoing dispute with his colleagues over 
the applicability of the Bill of Rights to the state governments through the Fourteenth 
Amendment”). 
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bracing the modern understanding that due process consists of af-
firmative rights simply brings us back to the question of whether aliens 
abroad should hold particular constitutional rights. 
In fact, even the promise of the older version was more apparent 
than real.  Justice Chase’s argument that the purposes of government 
will determine its scope and powers is plausible when that power is 
exercised against members of the political community.  It is plausible 
for what might be called veil of ignorance reasons:  the people might 
well hesitate to create a government with the power to take property 
from A and give it to B (to use one of Justice Chase’s examples)193 be-
cause they could not predict whether they or their posterity would be 
A or B.  More generally, it might well seem odd that a government 
created in part to protect property should be given the power arbitrar-
ily to seize property from those it is supposed to protect, and likewise 
with life and liberty.  But if A is an alien, an outsider to the commu-
nity, the matter appears in a different light.  The government is not 
created to protect the property, lives, or liberty of aliens, and no prin-
ciple of logic suggests that people would not create a government with 
the power to deal with aliens as ruthlessly as it pleases—for instance, 
to take their property and give it to citizens.194  And so the model of 
limited government also proves ultimately unable to determine the 
scope of the Constitution. 
E.  Mutuality of Obligation 
Neuman’s preferred model is what he calls “mutuality of obliga-
tion.”195  According to this model, constitutional rights “are prerequi-
sites for justifying legal obligation.”196  Thus, “when the United States 
asserts an alien’s obligation to comply with American law as a justifica-
tion for interfering with the alien’s freedom or property, the alien is 
presumptively entitled to the protection of all constitutional rights in 
the interaction.”197 
Like the other models, this one has a substantial presence in the 
case law, though frequently in dissent.  Mutuality is the key to Justice 
 
193 See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798). 
194 Even to enslave them.  See The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat) 66, 119-20 (1825) 
(observing that the slave trade is “contrary to the law of nature” but “could not be pro-
nounced repugnant to the law of nations”). 
195 NEUMAN, supra note 56, at 7. 
196 Id. at 8. 
197 Id. at 99.  Neuman notes that specific text or other factors may override the 
presumption.  See id. 
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Harlan’s dissent in Downes, which would impose constitutional re-
straints “[b]y whomsoever and wherever power is exercised in the 
name and under the authority of the United States, or of any branch 
of its government.”198  It appears in a supporting role in Reid, where 
Justice Black’s plurality opinion invoked the example of English colo-
nists who took with them “the duty of obedience” and also “all the 
rights and liberties of British Subjects.”199  And mutuality constituted 
the central argument in the dissents of Justices Brennan and Black-
mun in Verdugo-Urquidez.200 
This model has the potential to answer the question of constitu-
tional scope, though some lines remain to be drawn.  In Verdugo-
Urquidez, Brennan and Blackmun differed over what sort of exercise of 
government power would trigger correlative constitutional rights, with 
Blackmun writing separately to emphasize his belief that the mutuality 
requirement was triggered only by what he called the “exercise of sov-
ereignty.”201  Brennan’s understanding appears broader, at times ap-
proaching Harlan’s standard of the mere exercise of federal power.202 
If constitutional rights are called into play by any federal action, 
mutuality approaches universalism:  since the Constitution is generally 
good only against the government in the first place, that sort of mutu-
 
198 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 385 (1901) (Harlan J., dissenting). 
199 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 6 (1957).  The quoted passage suggests, but does not 
make explicit, a connection between the rights and the duties.  Describing the rights as 
those of “British Subjects” supports the implicit link. 
200 See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 279 (1990) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (“Today the Court holds that although foreign nationals must abide by our 
laws even when in their own countries, our Government need not abide by the Fourth 
Amendment when it investigates them for violations of our laws.”); id. at 282 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting) (“At the very least, the Fourth Amendment is an unavoidable cor-
relative of the Government’s power to enforce the criminal law.”); id. at 284 (Brennan, 
J., dissenting) (“Mutuality is essential to ensure the fundamental fairness that underlies 
our Bill of Rights.”); id. at 297 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“[W]hen a foreign national 
is held accountable for purported violations of United States criminal laws, he has ef-
fectively been treated as one of ‘the governed’ and therefore is entitled to Fourth 
Amendment protections.”). 
201 Id. at 297 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  Blackmun also opined that the Warrant 
Clause of the Fourth Amendment did not apply to extraterritorial searches.  Id. 
202 Brennan’s discussion of the Fourth Amendment as an absence of power, see id. 
at 288 (Brennan, J., dissenting), suggests a broad scope for its operation, as does his 
repetition of the Reid observation that the government “can only act in accordance 
with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution.”  Id. at 281 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Reid, 354 U.S. at 5-6).  He did apparently intend to exclude wartime op-
erations from the scope of the Amendment, but it is not clear what else.  See id. at 292 
(discussing the exceptions inherent in foreign “non-law enforcement activities not di-
rected against enemy aliens in wartime”). 
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ality imposes no limits beyond those already set in place by the state 
action requirement.  The plausibility of such an extensive conception 
of mutuality may be questioned.  The idea that aliens abroad should 
enjoy exactly the same rights as Americans in their interactions with 
the government appears impractical, and perhaps absurd.203  I have 
already discussed the failings of textualism and, as someone always 
asks, must the military give enemy soldiers hearings before shooting 
them in battle?  Neuman’s restrictive conception of the circumstances 
triggering mutuality appears to be motivated in part by a desire to 
avoid the reductio ad absurdum of “due process of war.”204 
This concern strikes me as significantly overstated.  The Hamdi 
Court noted that the government can hold a rights-bearing citizen as a 
prisoner of war,205 and if it can do that, it can presumably shoot him 
dead on the battlefield if he engages its forces.  Indeed, the govern-
ment conducted years of military operations against the quintessential 
rights-bearers—American citizens on American soil—and while the 
Civil War did produce some episodes of questionable constitutional-
ity,206 no one to my knowledge has suggested that the battle of Gettys-
burg was one.207 
Thus it seems possible—perhaps even desirable—to draw the 
boundaries of mutuality more broadly.  What happens, one wonders, 
if the government does not assert authority over aliens by reason of 
laws they have allegedly violated, but simply sweeps them up for de-
tention and interrogation on the grounds that they might have useful 
information?  Can it detain them incommunicado, and subject them 
 
203 One might also suppose that mutuality analysis is simply a first step, and that 
subsequent analysis might either suggest that aliens’ rights should be lesser, or defeat 
the presumption of applicability entirely.  See NEUMAN, supra note 56, at 115 (noting 
that rights are subject to analysis for reasonableness and exigency). 
204 Neuman, supra note 127, at 990; see also NEUMAN, supra note 56, at 100 (curtail-
ing the application of mutuality “to the residents of an adversary nation during armed 
hostilities”). 
205 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2640 (2004) (“There is no bar to this 
Nation’s holding one of its own citizens as an enemy combatant.”). 
206 See generally, e.g., Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866); Ex parte Merry-
man, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9,487). 
207 See Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 85 (1909) (“Public danger warrants the sub-
stitution of executive process for judicial process.  This was admitted with regard to 
killing men in the actual clash of arms . . . .”)  Even police officers, operating under 
the rather different law enforcement model, are authorized in some circumstances to 
use deadly force without a hearing.  On the distinction between the models of war and 
law enforcement, and their application to terrorism, see Noah Feldman, Choices of Law, 
Choices of War, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 457 (2002). 
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to stress positions and sleep deprivation, without the Constitution hav-
ing anything to say? 
These issues certainly have practical importance, but from a theo-
retical perspective they are mostly quibbles.  The mutuality model 
does have the capacity to set the scope of constitutional protections in 
a reasonably sensible fashion, and in that respect it is superior to the 
other models.  Is that enough to warrant our endorsement? 
Neuman’s most sustained argument in favor of the mutuality 
model takes the form of comparing it to the others.208  If these models 
were the only choices, that argument would be satisfactory.  I think, 
however, that there is another alternative to be considered, which is 
conflicts methodology.  The following Part asks what light conflicts 
can shed on the scope of the Constitution, and vice-versa. 
IV.  EXTRATERRITORIALITY FROM A CONFLICTS  
PERSPECTIVE 
From one perspective, the utility of conflicts methodology in de-
termining the scope of the Constitution might seem obvious.  Deter-
mining which rights particular people can invoke under particular 
circumstances is the bread and butter of conflicts thinking.  From an-
other, if we bring the problem of Guantanamo out of the subtext, it 
might not.  Conflicts analysis is conventionally understood as a means 
of deciding which of a number of different sovereigns has authority to 
regulate a transaction.  In Guantanamo, however, the issue is not 
whose law (or whose Constitution, except in the sense of Neuman’s 
article); it is whether the detainees are beyond the Constitution’s 
scope—strangers to it, in Neuman’s evocative phrase, or entirely in-
visible.  This feature need not, however, stop us from at least trying to 
apply some different conflicts methodologies.  If they seem incapable 
of dealing with the question, that may tell us as much about the 
methodologies as it does about Guantanamo. 
A.  Territoriality 
I have already criticized territoriality as a conflicts methodology, 
and its application to the Guantanamo detainees does not redeem it.  
Territoriality offers very little help in resolving the problem.  It simply 
tells us that if Guantanamo is within the territory of the United States, 
 
208 See NEUMAN, supra note 56, at 109-16 (comparing mutuality to universalism, 
the Hobbesian membership approach, and global due process). 
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the Constitution applies; if not, it does not.  This premise will produce 
different answers depending on whether we define territory by tech-
nical notions of sovereignty or by practical considerations of jurisdic-
tion and control.  It might also depend on how we construe the loca-
tion of the acts complained of.  For instance, the Rasul petitioners 
sued the President and other high-ranking executive officials, based 
on decisions made and orders given within the United States.  Those 
actors are indisputably subject to the Constitution—though one might 
respond that if the Constitution does not protect aliens abroad, orders 
to detain such people without due process do not violate it.209 
This shows one thing about territoriality, which is that its localiz-
ing rules tend to devolve into metaphysical hairsplitting.210  It also 
shows that territoriality does not offer much in the way of a sensible 
resolution.  It does, or could, tell us something about the scope of the 
Constitution, but it considers only one factor (geography), and it em-
ploys that factor in a mechanical way.  Territoriality resolves the prob-
lem of allocating authority between sovereigns by confining each to an 
exclusive sphere.  Having drawn geographical lines on the basis of au-
thority, territoriality goes on to suggest that once it is determined 
where an event takes place, the legal consequences of that event may 
be determined as if it were wholly domestic. 
It is for this reason that I suggested above that the territorialist 
model might beg the question.  To say that the Constitution applies 
within the United States is not the same as saying that it grants the 
 
209 Cf. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 124 S. Ct. 2739, 2748-50 (2004) (rejecting the 
“headquarters” doctrine). 
210 This is not to say that careful geographical analysis is not needed in questions 
of extraterritorial application of the Constitution.  The Verdugo-Urquidez Court seems 
quite right, for instance, to observe that since a Fourth Amendment violation occurs at 
the time of the search, rather than when the evidence is introduced, the location of 
the property is more significant than the location of the trial.  See United States v. Ver-
dugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990).  Similarly, while a Fifth Amendment self-
incrimination violation occurs when an improperly obtained confession is introduced, 
the propriety of the obtainment must be determined by taking into account where it 
occurred.  If the action of federal officers abroad is not subject to Fifth Amendment 
constraints—a position I do not endorse—then subsequent introduction of a confes-
sion obtained without Miranda warnings should be no more problematic than intro-
duction of a confession obtained by some private party who did not administer the 
warnings.  I thank Alex Sistla for this observation, which runs against the standard 
analysis.  See, e.g., Mark A. Godsey, Miranda’s Final Frontier—The International Arena:  A 
Critical Analysis of United States v. Bin Laden, and a Proposal for a New Miranda Exception 
Abroad, 51 DUKE L.J. 1703, 1723-26 (2002) (arguing that because “the privilege against 
self-incrimination is a trial right[,] . . . whether the interaction occurs within the bor-
ders of the United States or abroad becomes immaterial to the applicability of the 
privilege if the suspect later stands trial in the United States”). 
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same rights to all persons within the United States.211  Territoriality, as 
a one-step approach, does not distinguish between the question of 
whether U.S. law supplies the rule of decision and displaces compet-
ing laws (a question of priority) and the question of whether it grants 
rights to the parties invoking it (a question of scope).212  If, as per the 
conventional understanding, it answers the latter question, it does so 
on the basis of a factor (geography) whose relevance to that question 
it does not explain.213  Unsurprisingly, strict territoriality has fallen out 
of favor in domestic conflicts for essentially this reason. 
Perhaps the best that can be said for territoriality is that it simpli-
fies the work of judges by allowing them to avoid the difficult ques-
tions of how to operationalize constitutional provisions abroad.  How 
to apply the warrant “requirement” of the Fourth Amendment to for-
eign searches, for instance, is far from obvious.214  Of course, the his-
tory of constitutional law is one of adaptation of doctrine to new cir-
cumstances, but there is some reason to think that international 
application of constitutional provisions will present unusually difficult 
issues; it is more likely, for one thing, to bring the courts into conflict 
with the Executive’s handling of foreign affairs.  The appeal of territo-
 
211 Obviously, some distinctions are made in the text itself; my concern is with 
those further distinctions that might be made on the basis of status factors such as ille-
gal or involuntary entrance. 
212 See Kermit Roosevelt III, Resolving Renvoi:  The Bewitchment of Our Intelligence by 
Means of Language, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 101, 148-49 (2005) [hereinafter Roosevelt, 
Renvoi] (distinguishing between scope and priority). 
213 That is, territoriality is based on an understanding of the respective authority of 
different sovereigns, in particular that sovereigns cannot project their law beyond their 
borders.  But that premise does not tell us why they should extend rights equally to all 
within their borders, something they clearly have authority to decline to do.  Neuman’s 
interpretation of territoriality as mutuality does offer an explanation:  parties within a 
sovereign’s jurisdiction may claim rights as correlatives to their obligations under its 
law.  See NEUMAN, supra note 56, at 7-8.  This is quite likely the best argument that can 
be made, but in the modern world where federal law is pervasively extraterritorial in 
scope, it is no longer an argument for territorial restrictions on the scope of the Con-
stitution. 
214 See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 274 (noting the “sea of uncertainty as to what 
might be reasonable in the way of searches and seizures conducted abroad”); id. at 279 
(Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that the Warrant Clause has no application to 
searches abroad because “American magistrates have no power to authorize such 
searches”).  One might respond that the Fourth Amendment actually imposes a rea-
sonableness requirement, not a warrant requirement, see Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth 
Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 762-81 (1994), or that an American 
magistrate can indeed authorize searches by American authorities as far as the Ameri-
can Constitution is concerned (leaving aside, that is, the question of whether foreign 
law can effect a prohibition).  It is true, however, that applying constitutional provi-
sions to government action abroad would raise some new issues. 
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rialism is thus not inexplicable:  just as it did in domestic conflicts, it 
seems to offer a simple solution to otherwise difficult problems.  This 
argument has not carried the day in domestic conflicts, however, and 
it is too much a counsel of despair to hold great appeal in the interna-
tional setting.  We should at least consider whether we can do better. 
B.  The Second Restatement 
The Second Restatement would tell us that the law governing the de-
tainees’ claims is that of the sovereign with the most significant rela-
tionship to the case.  To identify that sovereign, we would consult the 
familiar list of section 6 factors.215  The inquiry is underdetermined in 
most cases, but let us suppose that here it suggests the United States.  
This analysis does not seem, however, to answer the question of 
whether aliens abroad can claim rights under the United States Con-
stitution.  At least, it is an extremely poorly-designed way of doing so. 
The section 6 factors identify the sovereign with the greatest claim 
to authority; that is, they are designed to resolve conflicting claims of 
authority.  They form what I have called a rule of priority, which lets 
courts pick between competing claims of right.216  Here, however, we 
are dealing with an issue of the scope of the Constitution.  The Second 
Restatement blends some scope-related concerns into its rule of prior-
ity, but it has no distinct scope analysis.217  That is, it does not concern 
itself with whether an individual should actually be able to claim rights 
under the law it determines is “applicable.” 
The neglect of scope analysis makes the Second Restatement largely 
useless in resolving the problem of Guantanamo.  It tells us that U.S. 
law applies in one sense—that the case should be decided according 
to U.S. law.  But that we knew already; the detainees will obviously not 
be able to get relief under Cuban law.  It does not tell us whether the 
Constitution applies, in the sense of granting rights that plaintiffs may 
invoke. 
Exactly the same defect appears in the Second Restatement’s treat-
ment of domestic conflicts.  Having identified the sovereign with the 
most significant relationship to the issue, the Second Restatement then 
 
215 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1971). 
216 See Roosevelt, Renvoi, supra note 212, at 149. 
217 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2)(c) (noting the rele-
vance of states’ interests and policies).  These are, I will suggest, essentially the consid-
erations that should come into play in determining whether a law grants a party a 
right. 
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seems to contemplate deciding the case under that sovereign’s law as 
though it were a purely domestic case—it runs together the two 
senses, distinguished in the preceding paragraph, in which a law 
might “apply.”  Or, to use the terminology I believe is more helpful, 
the Second Restatement appears to assume that its rule of priority will 
also be used to determine the scope of a sovereign’s law.  This can re-
sult in peculiar anomalies. 
The basic problem is this:  the Second Restatement tells courts to ap-
ply some sovereign’s law on an issue without asking whether that law 
(or the law of some other sovereign) actually grants the parties 
rights.218  If it selects a law that does not grant rights, two equally un-
appealing possibilities present themselves.  First, as the Second Restate-
ment seems to suggest, a court might go ahead and apply that law as 
though the case were purely domestic—i.e., enforce rights that do not 
exist according to the courts of the sovereign whose law has been se-
lected.  I think there is something wrong with that resolution; indeed, 
I think that in the interstate context the problem is of constitutional 
magnitude.219  A second alternative would be to select a law according 
to the Second Restatement methodology and then engage in a process of 
interpretation to determine whether that law grants rights to the party 
invoking it.  If it doesn’t, the court could simply decide the issue 
against that party.  This approach, however, neglects the possibility 
that the law of some other sovereign (one with a less significant rela-
tionship) might grant that party rights, and, again, this neglect is 
problematic. 
C.  A Two-Step Model 
What is needed, as I and others have suggested, is an approach to 
conflicts that consists of two steps.220  The first step concerns itself with 
 
218 Suppose, for instance, that two individuals from territorialist State A are in-
volved in a one-car accident in Second Restatement State B.  A State B court might find 
State A most significantly related on some issue of loss-allocation, even though State A 
courts would rule that A law gives neither party any rights on these facts.  To hold that 
State A law “applies” in both senses of the word “apply”—that is, to hold not only that 
the case will be decided under State A law, but also that it will be decided as if it were 
purely domestic to State A—ignores the authority that State A courts should have in 
setting the scope of their own law.  Astute readers will recognize this as the renvoi 
problem, and I have argued at (much) greater length elsewhere that the renvoi prob-
lem points to a fundamental defect in conventional conflicts thinking, found in both 
territoriality and the Second Restatement.  See Roosevelt, Renvoi, supra note 212, at 165-67. 
219 See id. at 137-42. 
220 See Kramer, Rethinking, supra note 41, at 280-83 (advocating a two-step ap-
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questions of scope.  The court should ask whether the laws the parties 
invoke actually grant them rights.  This analysis might reveal that only 
one party has rights, in which case the court can simply enforce those 
rights.221  Or it might turn out that neither party has rights, in which 
case the suit can be dismissed.222  Last, it might be that each party has a 
right under the law of a different sovereign, in which case the court 
would need to decide which right should prevail.223  For this second 
step, the court should apply a rule of priority. 
Rules of priority are not at issue in the Guantanamo case.224  The 
only question is whether the petitioners come within the scope of the 
Constitution, and in particular the due process clause.  This is the 
question we began with, and it is time now to see how a proper con-
flicts theory could help to answer it. 
 
proach); Roosevelt, Myth, supra note 41, at 2485-88 (distinguishing between questions 
about the scope of rights and questions about conflicts between rights).  Kramer sug-
gests, and I agree, that this approach is an application of the basic insights of Brainerd 
Currie.  I would call it interest analysis, but nothing turns on the genealogy, and the 
question of how interest analysis should be understood has proved surprisingly divisive.  
See Letter from Larry Kramer to Harry C. Sigman, Esq. (Aug. 4, 1994), reprinted in Ap-
pendix B, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 455 (1995) (noting differences among modern 
interest analysts).  Consequently, I will simply acknowledge a debt to Currie (for those 
who find the two-step model consistent with his thinking) while disavowing any at-
tempt to impute this precise model to him (for those who do not). 
221 This would correspond to Currie’s false conflict.  See CURRIE, supra note 46, at 
77-107. 
222 This would correspond to Currie’s unprovided-for case.  See id.  The solution of 
dismissing for failing to state a claim was first suggested by Larry Kramer.  See Kramer, 
The “Unprovided-For” Case, supra note 75, at 1060-64 (advocating dismissal in cases where 
the plaintiff has no right to recover under either state’s laws). 
223 This would correspond to Currie’s true conflict.  See CURRIE, supra note 46, at 
77-107. 
224 In other federal extraterritoriality cases, they might be—that is, aliens abroad 
might in some circumstances be able to invoke the protections of a foreign law author-
izing the acts alleged to violate American law.  See, e.g., Timberlane Lumber Co. v. 
Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 614 (9th Cir. 1976) (noting possibility of deferring to for-
eign law in antitrust context); Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 285-87 (1952) 
(same); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 586-87 (1953) (same with respect to Jones 
Act).  In Hartford Fire, the majority notably ignored this possibility, assuming that if a 
particular act fell within the scope of the Sherman Act, the case must be decided as if it 
were purely domestic.  Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 794-99 (1993).  
As Justice Scalia observed in dissent, federal law contains what I would characterize as a 
built-in rule of priority, allowing “state regulatory statutes to override the Sherman Act 
in the insurance field . . . .”  Id. at 819 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  That strongly suggests 
that Congress might well intend foreign regulatory statutes to prevail in similar cir-
cumstances, a possibility revealed by the two-step analysis but obscured by framing the 
question as simply whether U.S. law “applies.” 
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How should a court go about doing scope analysis within the two-
step model?  Again, the methodology I suggest resembles that of in-
terest analysis.  As Kramer puts it, “[t]he basic premise . . . is that the 
court should determine what policy a law was enacted to achieve in 
wholly domestic cases and ask whether there are connections between 
the case and the nation implicating that policy.”225  That is, the court 
should focus on the particular right at issue and whether its applica-
tion to a case with foreign elements will promote its domestic pur-
pose.226 
This is not necessarily an easy task.  A simplistic approach might 
say that the purpose of the individual rights provisions of the Consti-
tution is to protect particular liberties, and to the question “Whose 
liberties?” respond, “Those of Americans, of course!”227  But that is 
nothing more than restating the question and answering it through a 
crude application of the membership model.  If we can do no better, 
the methodology would merit the kind of accusations Lea Brilmayer 
has leveled against interest analysis:  that it simply substitutes a pre-
sumptive domiciliary focus for a presumptive territorial focus.228 
I think we can do better, both with interest analysis and the Con-
stitution, though I will restrict my discussion here to the latter.  Some 
provisions—for instance, the Fourth Amendment—seem likely to pose 
a substantial challenge.  Without a well-developed theory of what the 
Fourth Amendment is for, we are left asking whether its application to 
searches of aliens’ property abroad implicates the “right of the people 
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against un-
 
225 Kramer, Vestiges, supra note 44, at 213; see also, e.g., Kramer, Rethinking, supra 
note 41, at 290-93 (demonstrating the methodology); Roosevelt, Myth, supra note 41, at 
2486-87 (same). 
226 To some extent, this approach parallels the “refined incorporation” Akhil 
Amar has suggested as the proper method of deciding whether a Bill of Rights provi-
sion binds the states.  See AMAR, supra note 187, at 139-40.  In particular, it focuses at-
tention on the substance of the particular right, rather than attempting to resolve the 
question of constitutional scope all at once, as the models considered in the preceding 
Part seem, with the exception of limited government, to contemplate.  Neuman does 
suggest looking to the purpose of constitutional provisions, but he likewise appears to 
do so at the wholesale rather than the retail level.  See NEUMAN, supra note 56, at 97 
(“To resolve the question of the proper scope of the individual-rights provisions of the 
United States Constitution, it is useful to ask . . . what United States constitutional 
rights are for.”). 
227 Cf. CURRIE, supra note 46, at 85 (asserting that Massachusetts is concerned with 
the welfare of “Massachusetts married women”). 
228 See LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICT OF LAWS 85-87 (2d. ed. 1995) (criticizing Currie’s 
domiciliary focus). 
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reasonable searches and seizures.”229  I confess the answer to this is not 
obvious to me, though one might well conclude that a search for 
items to be introduced at a U.S. trial as evidence of the violation of 
U.S. laws brings its target within the community of the “people.”230 
Other provisions seem more tractable, which suggests to me that 
the effort is worthwhile.  Consider, for example, the First Amend-
ment.  The purpose of the speech clause has received substantial 
scholarly attention, with conventional accounts tending to ring the 
changes on two main themes:  facilitating democracy by informing the 
electorate and promoting self-actualization.231  The first of these might 
be implicated by actions against aliens abroad, most obviously if they 
are attempting to communicate with Americans.232  Alien communica-
tion to other aliens, by contrast, seems much less relevant to the First 
Amendment’s domestic purpose of facilitating democracy.233  As for 
self-actualization, a domiciliary focus seems appropriate:  it is hard to 
see why the Constitution would be concerned with the self-
actualization of aliens abroad.  Thus it seems possible to conclude that 
the government should have greater latitude in regulating speech 
among aliens abroad than it does in the domestic context, at least as 
far as the First Amendment is concerned.234 
 
229 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
230 This would amount to an endorsement of some form of mutuality in the 
Fourth Amendment context.  Supposing that the Fourth Amendment does grant ali-
ens abroad some protection, it might also make sense to look to foreign standards to 
determine what searches are reasonable. 
231 See Kermit Roosevelt, Note, The Costs of Agencies:  Waters v. Churchill and the First 
Amendment in the Administrative State, 106 YALE L.J. 1233, 1250-52 (1997) (describing 
“speaker-centered” and “listener-centered” models of the First Amendment). 
232 In such cases, of course, Americans would be able to assert their rights as will-
ing listeners under current doctrine.  See, e.g., Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens 
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 756-57 (1976); Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 
301, 308 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring).  Thus, this analysis might not change re-
sults very much, though it would allow the aliens to litigate in their own right.  But the 
very fact that the Court has reached similar results, by whatever rationale, indicates its 
recognition that the First Amendment is at stake in such communications. 
233 Thus, for instance, a federal decision to support a particular foreign political 
party seems unlikely to trigger the same kind of “funding forum” concerns it might in 
the United States. 
234 This is not to say that attempts at such regulation would be a good idea, only 
that on the account of the First Amendment developed in the text, the First Amend-
ment would not be a barrier.  If we understand the First Amendment differently—if, 
for instance, we suppose that it has some moral dimension, reflecting a judgment that 
governmental restraints of speech are intrinsically abhorrent—then we would likely 
reach a different conclusion.  If it were the case that the First Amendment did not bar 
criminalization of speech among aliens abroad, however, I believe it should make no 
difference if the government seeks to try defendants within the United States.  This is 
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The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment presents dif-
ferent issues.  Again, substantial scholarship on its purpose exists.235  
Suppose that its purpose may be formulated as protecting a commu-
nity within which neither a particular religion, nor religion in general, 
is supported by compulsory individual donations or receives the en-
dorsement of the government.236  Is this purpose implicated by federal 
action abroad? 
The answer to this question is probably yes.  Federal expenditures 
in support of religion abroad clearly convey a message of governmen-
tal favoritism, and they compel individual taxpayers to support relig-
ions with which they may disagree.  Thus, the Establishment Clause 
should operate to restrain federal action abroad.  That is not necessar-
ily to say that aliens abroad should be able to bring claims.  They are 
not, generally speaking, taxpayers, nor can they argue that federal en-
dorsement of religion marks them as second-class citizens, for they 
are not citizens at all.  In this case the purpose-based analysis tends to 
accord with mutuality, as potential Establishment Clause violations are 
unlikely to involve the assertion of authority over aliens.  However, it 
also answers the question of whether federal action abroad can violate 
Americans’ Establishment Clause rights, which mutuality does not. 
I do not claim that these analyses are authoritative.  Others may 
have different conceptions of the purpose of the provisions I have 
considered, or different views on what sort of contacts implicate those 
purposes.  But they seem plausible enough to make me think the 
methodology is sound.237 
 
contrary to Neuman’s understanding, see Gerald L. Neuman, Extraterritorial Rights and 
Constitutional Methodology After Rasul v. Bush, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 2073, 2083 (2005), and 
quite likely inconsistent with the practice of U.S. courts, but I think it is the correct 
analysis.  If speech among aliens abroad is unprotected by the First Amendment, then 
it is outside the Amendment’s scope, in much the same way as if it had been deemed 
obscenity or fighting words.  The location of the trial makes no difference. 
235 For a recent and comprehensive treatment, see Noah Feldman, The Intellectual 
Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346 (2002). 
236 This statement does not do justice to the complexity of Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence and scholarship, but its accuracy is essentially irrelevant to the value of 
the methodology I demonstrate. 
237 In his gracious response to this Article, Professor Neuman questions the start-
ing point of the approach:  the premise that a purpose-based analysis of constitutional 
provisions should look to the benefits they secure for Americans or within the United 
States rather than their “value to rights-holders considered in the abstract or in a con-
text that can be generalized.”  Neuman, supra note 234, at 2080-81.  As I hope the dis-
cussion in the text demonstrates, I certainly agree with Neuman that it would be a mis-
take to take this domestic focus as the last step—to adopt the crude version of the 
membership model.  But I do find it plausible as a first step because I believe that, as 
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V.  APPLYING CONFLICTS METHODOLOGY  
TO GUANTANAMO 
It is time now to return, again, to Guantanamo.  Here the ques-
tion to ask is what the purpose of the Due Process Clause is.  One 
purpose is to protect people from arbitrary government action, and if 
that is all, then extending its scope to aliens abroad may seem tenu-
ous.  The U.S. Constitution probably has no general concern with the 
welfare of aliens abroad.  But if that is the only purpose, one might 
also wonder why due process rights extend to aliens within the United 
States.  Is, perhaps, an additional aim of the Due Process Clause sim-
ply to prevent the government from engaging in arbitrary or despotic 
acts? 
One may construct pragmatic arguments for this suggestion and 
tie them to the interests of U.S. citizens—a government in the habit of 
tyrannizing aliens may be more likely to tyrannize Americans, for in-
stance, or to disrupt Americans’ personal or commercial relationships 
with aliens.  I do not intend to diminish the significance of these con-
cerns, but I would suggest another, which relates less to the immediate 
interests of Americans and more to their values. 
The United States government is not a principal.  It is the agent of 
the people, and it wields in our name the powers we have seen fit to 
give it.  It might be worthwhile to ask, then, in the manner of Justice 
Chase, what sort of government we have created.  Did we unleash 
upon the world an agent with no obligation to respect even the most 
basic rights of our alien friends?238  What kind of a people would do 
such a thing?  Or more briefly, what kind of a people are we? 
 
the Preamble suggests, the Constitution is concerned with America and Americans, 
and the extension of rights to foreigners (wherever they are located) must therefore 
be justified by some domestic consequence.  It bears mention, however, that this 
methodology is, in principle, compatible with Neuman’s mutuality thesis.  If, as Neu-
man claims, one overarching purpose of U.S. constitutional rights is to legitimize U.S. 
claims of authority, then that purpose might well be implicated by any assertion of au-
thority over aliens abroad.  See NEUMAN, supra note 56, at 98 (“The rationale of the 
mutuality approach has been the presumption that American constitutional rights and 
the obligation of obedience to American law go together . . . .”).  The idea is appeal-
ing.  I wonder, however, how confident we can be in ascribing to the Constitution a 
purpose to impose such a strong legitimacy constraint on the foreign affairs power.  
The federal government would not be intrinsically illegitimate if the First Amendment 
did not exist (is the British government illegitimate?), and so I do not think the legiti-
macy of the exercise of federal power abroad necessarily requires extension of all con-
stitutional rights to those over whom authority is asserted. 
238 Historical precedents exist.  The Alien Act allowed resident aliens to be de-
ported and in some circumstances imprisoned “so long as, in the opinion of the presi-
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This strikes me as the basic question.  Laurence Tribe has argued 
that many constitutional issues cannot be resolved without a choice of 
values,239 and while I think that the set of such cases is actually rela-
tively narrow, this may be one.  The question of the due process rights 
of the Guantanamo detainees, and of aliens abroad more generally, 
comes down to a question of what our values are.240 
America does stand for things, in aspiration if not always in prac-
tice.  Examining the consistency of governmental action with those 
aspirations is a familiar means of constitutional adjudication.  As Jus-
tice Brennan observed in Verdugo-Urquidez, “[f]or over 200 years, our 
country has considered itself the world’s foremost protector of liber-
ties. . . . Our national interest is defined by those values and by the 
need to preserve our own just institutions.”241  Over a century earlier, 
Justice Mathews noted that “[w]hen we consider the nature and the 
theory of our institutions of government [and] the principles on 
which they are supposed to rest . . . we are constrained to conclude 
that they do not mean to leave room for the play and action of purely 
personal and arbitrary power.”242 
Times of crisis test these principles.  As the Supreme Court stated 
in Hamdi: 
 
dent, the public safety might require.”  See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 
698, 747 (1893) (Field, J., dissenting) (discussing Alien Act in a case involving govern-
mental power to deport resident Chinese aliens).  Madison responded in protest that 
“[a]lien friends, except in the single case of public ministers, are under the municipal 
law, and must be tried and punished according to the law only.”  Id. at 750 (Field, J., 
dissenting) (quoting 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES 556 (photo. reprint 1996) (2d ed. J.B. Lip-
pincott Co. 1891)).  “[I]t will surprise most people,” Field continued (speaking now to 
the facts of Fong Yue Ting), “to learn that any such dangerous and despotic power lies 
in our government . . . .”  Id. 
239 See Laurence H. Tribe, The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based Constitutional Theo-
ries, 89 YALE L.J. 1063, 1064 (1980) (arguing that a process-based theme of Constitu-
tional interpretation requires “a full theory of substantive rights and values”). 
240 And from this perspective, I believe that the modality of constitutional argu-
ment most relevant to the Guantanamo case is what Bobbitt terms ethical—one that 
appeals to the basic animating values of our history and constitutional traditions.  See 
BOBBITT, supra note 127, at 93-119 (defining an ethical argument as one based in the 
character of the American polity and providing examples of such arguments in consti-
tutional law cases).  Neuman’s reliance on social contract theory is likewise a form of 
ethical argument. See supra Part III.C; Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution, 
66 FOREIGN AFF. 284, 307 (1987) (suggesting we must look to “what kind of country we 
are and wish to be” to determine the extraterritorial effect of American law). 
241 United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 285-86 (1990) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
242 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369-70 (1886); see also Fong Yue Ting, 149 
U.S. at 755 (Field, J., dissenting) (“Arbitrary and tyrannical power has no place in our 
system.”). 
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[I]t is equally vital that our calculus not give short shrift to the values 
that this country holds dear or to the privilege that is American citizen-
ship.  It is during our most challenging and uncertain moments that our 
Nation’s commitment to due process is most severely tested; and it is in 
those times that we must preserve our commitment at home to the prin-
ciples for which we fight abroad.
243
 
That is well and good as far as it goes.244  The case of the Guan-
tanamo detainees raises a further question:  is it the values or the citi-
zenship that is most important?  Are we committed to these principles 
only at home, or might they have some relevance abroad?  This is a 
stark choice, between honoring the principles we fight for and de-
grading them, between asserting that our rights are the only ones that 
matter245 and demonstrating a decent respect for the opinions of 
mankind.246 
What kind of a people are we?  We have confronted this question 
at other crises in American history, and the Court, responding to the 
felt necessities of the times, has rendered decisions that cast neither it 
nor us in the best light.247  Those cases are now viewed with regret, as 
object lessons testifying that history vindicates neither undue restric-
tion of the community of rights-bearers, nor blind deference to the 
Executive.  Rasul suggests, if nothing else, that these lessons have been 
absorbed.  Things may be different the next time round.  No judicial 
decision will restore the good will that the Executive has cost us.  No 
 
243 Hamdi, 124 S. Ct. at 2648. 
244 As things turned out, the Executive opted to release Hamdi rather than at-
tempt to justify his detention in court.  See Editorial, Freeing Mr. Hamdi, WASH. POST, 
Sept. 24, 2004, at A24 (discussing Hamdi’s release and the surrounding issues).  The 
government agreed to release Hamdi on the condition that he renounce his U.S. citi-
zenship.  See id.  Given his treatment at the hands of his (and our) government, Hamdi 
might be excused for deeming this a small sacrifice.  How significant a role his citizen-
ship played in the outcome of his case will be determined by the aftermath of Rasul. 
245 To simplify the analysis, Currie at one point hypothesized such a “selfish state, 
concerned only with promoting its own interests.”  CURRIE, supra note 46, at 89.  But 
he went on to admit the possibility that “such an attitude [might] be shocking, or un-
wise, or unjust, or unconstitutional.”  Id. 
246 See, e.g., Brief of 175 Members of Both Houses of the Parliament of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland as Amici Curiae in Support of Peti-
tioners at 2 n.5, Rasul v. Bush, 124 S. Ct. 2686 (2004) (Nos. 03-342, 03-334) (“Members 
of Parliament have employed every potential avenue to voice concern for the British 
detainees and turn now to this Court as an alternative, independent route to ensure 
that due process is provided.”), available at 2004 WL 96766. 
247 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 223-24 (1944) (deferring to 
executive assertions about demands of national security); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 
U.S. (19 How.) 393, 403-06 (1856) (holding that African Americans could not attain 
national citizenship). 
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court can undo the abuses inflicted in Guantanamo and elsewhere, 
any more than the belated reparations offered to Japanese Americans 
in 1988 could erase the internment camps.  But this time, perhaps, it 
will not take us nearly half a century to figure out that this is not who 
we want to be. 
 
